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INTRODUCTION
Rarely do new groups have their rights recognized without first endu-
ring protracted struggles. We expect conflict between those who support the
extension and those who do not. These are the battles of a clearly defined
"right/good" and a contrary "wrong/evil." Less anticipated and much mess-
ier are the struggles among allies. Here the fights are not in defense of the
ennobling principle on which they agree, but over the better strategy to ap-
ply that principle and achieve its goals.
Minority groups typically unite in the early efforts to have their rights
recognized by the wider society. After initial successes, however, these
groups begin to disagree among themselves about what should follow. Some
advocate an all-out assault on the status quo as the only way to effect the de-
sired change, a revolution of sorts against stubborn opposition. Others prefer
more subtle, gradual processes intended less to defeat the opposition than to
convert them.
Within the first generation of African American activists this tension
pitted the moderate gradualism of Booker T. Washington against the mili-
tancy of W.E.B. Du Bois.' This conflict replayed in the next generation be-
tween the ideologies of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X.' Within the
gays' rights movement the same debate emerges in the contrast between the
conservatism of Andrew Sullivan and the liberationist rhetoric of Urvashi
Vaid.3
1. Compare, for example, Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903) with Washington's
Up from Slavery (1901), both available in THREE NEGRO CLASSICS (1965).
2. See ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1964).
3. The contrast is apparent upon a comparison of Andrew Sullivan's VIRTUALLY
NORMAL (1995) (arguing that the government should be asked to remedy only public dis-
crimination, limiting the foci of activism to the military exclusion and marriage issues) with
Urvashi Vaid's VIRTUAL EQUALITY (1995) (arguing that the gays' rights movement should
encompass racism and sexism, among other issues, rather than limiting the movement to
merely "our" issues).
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Every civil rights movement must, at some point, ask itself these same
questions: Should we compromise on a matter of principle, settling for less
than what we know is needed in order to get now what can be gotten, leaving
the rest for later? That is, should we adopt a strategy of rights incremental-
ism?' Or should we reject a seemingly reasonable counteroffer and hold out
for the total list of demands, accepting nothing if we cannot get everything,
employing a strategy of rights wholesale-ism? Another pair of questions runs
parallel to the first: Should we limit demands to "our" issues, or should we
embrace a broader agenda defending the rights of all persons, refusing to ac-
cept any victory which limits its concessions to only "us"?
This article does not resolve these difficult issues. Instead, it challenges
a basic assumption made by those participating in these debates: that incre-
mentalist strategies are rationally defendable. Moreover, since incremental-
ism is equivalent to nonincrementalism in all but the short-term realities, the
preference for one strategy over the other rests on merely subjective grounds
of personal taste, style or expediency. The conclusion is that while incre-
mentalism accurately describes historical processes, it has no foundation as a
deliberate strategy. In other words, although in retrospect incremental pro-
gress may be achieved, that should never be the goal from the outset. While
this observation applies to any struggle for rights, the illustrative case
throughout this article will be that of gays' rights and the push for the Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act.'
The problem of incrementalism emerges from the common practice of
limiting certain rights only to groups on certified lists.' Section I reviews this
4. "Rights incrementalism," as will be made clearer in the following discussion, refers to
a group's gradual movement toward attaining a new right by small steps. A current example
would be the characterization of civil unions as a "step" on the way to full marriage for same-
sex couples. The example that will be most closely examined in this article is the argument
that employment discrimination protections for gays is a step toward the goal of universal
human rights.
5. I continue here a terminological distinction introduced earlier. See James N1. Donovan.
A Philosophical Ground for Gays' Rights: We Must Learn What is True il Order to Do What
is Right, 4 GEORGE MASON Civit. RIGtTS L.J. 1, 2 (1993). The more common term "gay
rights" can be too easily misconstrued as referring to rights restricted to gays. the "special
rights" so energetically invoked by conservatives. That reading does seem to follow from us-
ing "gay" as an adjective to modify "rights."
To diffuse this false conclusion, I use the more accurate "gays' rights." to highlight the
point that the issue is the ordinary rights of people who happen to be gay. and not the special
or unique rights reservedfor gay people.
I also use the noun "gay" to include both men and women unless otherwise specified. Par-
ticularly, "gay and lesbian" is eschewed because it connotes that "gay" is the masculine col-
lateral term to "lesbian," when it should properly be "gay man." Trying to preserve the noun
as an inclusive terms is admittedly a minority position, but then so too is being a gay man, so
perhaps I simply have an affinity for minority causes.
6. Examples of "certified lists" in this article include those who are entitled to causes of
actions for wrongful death and visitation of minor children. Other lists would be those at-
tached to hate crime laws, enumerating those groups against whom certain acts can trigger
additional criminal charges or enhanced penalties. and nondiscrimination laws generally.
specifying those groups against whom it is illegal to discriminate in housing, employment.
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problem of the list, and how the failure of lists to include gay men and lesbi-
ans profoundly impacts their daily lives. Possible strategic responses to this
problem (such as doing nothing, interpreting the current list to include us,
eliminating the list altogether, or expanding the list to include us explicitly)
are considered in Section II, concluding by focusing on a special kind of
gradualism, list incrementalism. List incrementalism occurs when a right is
extended to new groups by merely adding them to the relevant list. Pre-
sumably, the longer and more detailed the list, fewer groups would be ex-
periencing systematic discrimination on that particular issue. The addition of
a new group is often justified in terms of taking a step toward realizing the
ultimate goal of protections for all, thereby raising the issue of "human
rights."
Subsequent sections scrutinize list incrementalism from three different
perspectives: the formal, the practical, and the philosophical. The formal
analysis (Section III) considers whether, given the inherent imprecision of
language, the quest for legal exactitude may not make matters worse. I con-
tend that the addition of details by creating new lists and expanding existing
lists, although done with the intent to clarify the law, instead introduces un-
certainty.
The practical analysis in Section IV balances the actual costs of imple-
menting an incrementalist strategy against the benefits the strategy is ex-
pected to yield. In contexts where incrementalism seems most reasonable,
the costs are demonstrably very high and the benefits few, so that society is
worse off in the long run. Section IV discusses the prototypical example of
the list of inclusion: the list of groups against whom employment discrimina-
tion should be expressly prohibited.
The two analyses address the first question regarding the prima facie va-
lidity or desirability of the incrementalist strategy. As usually presented, the
choice between incrementalism and radical wholesale strategies can be in-
fluenced by many factors-political, economic, even psychological-but the
options do not differ on their underlying concept of human rights, the pur-
ported end goal. This assumption is probably wrong. The philosophical
analysis in Section V critiques the assumption that incrementalist and whole-
sale strategies are merely different paths directed toward the same objective
of universal human rights.
These three analyses illustrate that the assumption that rights incremen-
talism is intellectually unproblematic and a reasonable alternative strategy is
false. All things considered, incrementalism is extraordinarily difficult to
justify as a deliberate strategy to effect rights reform. Perhaps it should not
be justified at all. Section VI parries the objection that the rejection of in-
crementalism as a credible strategy will lead to destructive dogmatism in the
political arena.
and other contexts. Most organizations, including universities, have lists of their own within
their nondiscrimination policies.
[Vol. 38
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I. THE PROBLEM OF THE LIST
When asked about her position on gay marriage, then Senator-elect
Hillary Clinton acknowledged that she did not support it, but that she did
support legal protections such as domestic partnerships and same-sex civil
unions.7 She counseled that "it's important not to let the perfect be the en-
emy of the good."'
Clinton's reply captures nicely the problematic choice for advocates of
any rights issue. Should they hold out for the "perfect" wholesale attainment
of their envisioned goal, or should they accept the "good" compromise
which will inch the issue gradually forward? Once the distinction has been
made, other strategic options present themselves. Should they deliberately
bid "high" at the outset, hoping that any subsequent compromise will more
closely approximate their final objective? It is one thing to accept compro-
mise as the only achievable goal at a particular time; it is surely quite an-
other to go into the struggle intending to compromise. In most scenarios the
goals of the perfect and the good are mutually exclusive. One cannot simul-
taneously aspire to both.
The alternatives of the wholesale and the incrementalist rights strategies
have rarely been examined closely.' More typically, any apparent choice is
recognized only in hindsight. If either is to be preferred at a gut level, it may
be the gradual. We think ourselves a reasonable people, and tend to find stri-
dent dogmatism of any kind irrational and-perhaps even more unforgiv-
able-uncouth.'"
Incrementalism is both characterized and justified by the belief that the
sum of small, achievable steps will have the same long-term outcome as a
rare and more difficult single leap (i.e., a sea change). The explicit goal is
claimed to be the same; only the route toward that end varies. Gradual pro-
gress can take at least two forms: step incrementalism and list incremental-
ism." Hillary Clinton's stance on gay marriage is an example of step incre-
7. David Kirby, Hillary Up Close and Personal, N0 823 THE ADVOCATE 38. 44 (Oct. 24.
2000).
8. Id.
9. One exception is a brief yet insightful essay that identifies the major themes argued in
detail by this article. See David B. Mixner, Knowing When (Not) to Compromise. 7(3) TiE
GAY & LESBtAN REVIEW 9 (Summer 2000).
10. Aristotle echoes this opinion in the Nicomachean Ethics: "exaggerations are weari-
some." Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKs OF ARisTOTLE 927, 999 (W.D. Ross trans..
Richard McKeon ed., 1941). The translation by J.E.C. Welldon of the same passage captures
the point even better: "all excesses are offensive." ARISToTE, THE NicoMAcIEAN Entics 136
(J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1987).
11. Although spoken of as discrete alternatives, step incrementalism and list incremental-
ism are translatable one into the other. For example, employment non-discrimination is an
example of list incrementalism when getting on the list of protected groups is justified in the
pursuit of employment freedoms for all. The same act becomes an example of step incremen-
talism when viewed as one step further on the way to full civil rights for gay men and lesbi-
ans.
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mentalism: if the real goal cannot be achieved, some kind of intermediary
step will be taken, such as domestic partnerships. Our attention shall be di-
rected toward the second, list incrementalism, as a rational response to the
problem of the list.
The problem of the list arises because many of the rights granted by our
society are extended only to groups on explicit lists. These lists take two
forms: those intended to restrict rights to a specific class of claimant (lists of
restriction), and those intended to assure explicitly that disenfranchised
groups enjoy the basic rights of every citizen (lists of inclusion).
A. Lists of Restriction
Lists of restriction limit the universe of potential claimants to a particu-
lar right. Causes of action are one common context for lists of restriction.
For example, the right to collect for injuries in survival actions, wrongful
death actions, and bystander actions normally belong only to persons spe-
cifically enumerated by statute."
The importance of being on a list of restriction is self-evident. The list
deliberately privileges or favors some classes of individuals over others. In
the case of bystander actions, presence on the list signifies the recognition by
society that these are the relationships most likely to suffer detrimental im-
pact from the injury to a victim, and that therefore they should have legal re-
course to recover for their own injuries. But why limit tort actions to some
relationships while denying others?
I would not seek to limit the class by reference to particular relationships
such as husband and wife or parent and child. The kinds of relationship
[sic] which may involve close ties of love and affection are numerous, and
it is the existence of such ties which leads to mental disturbance when the
loved one suffers a catastrophe. They may be present in family relation-
ships or those of close friendship, and may be stronger in the case of en-
gaged couples than in that of persons who have been married to each other
for many years. It is common knowledge that such ties exist, and reasona-
bly foreseeable that those bound by them may in certain circumstances be
at real risk of psychiatric illness if the loved one is injured or put in peril."
List incrementalism views the immediate act as one of several of the same kind required
to fully achieve the goal of extending that right to all; step incrementalism regards the imme-
diate act as one among other different kinds necessary to fully achieve the goal of extending
the full complement of rights to a specific group.
12. In Louisiana, the possible claimants are restricted to spouses, children, parents, sib-
lings and grandparents. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2, and 2315.6 (West 1997).
13. Alcock v. Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police, [1992] 1 A.C. 310, 397
(Lord Keith of Kinkel) (holding that the right to claim damages for nervous shock arising
from injury to another was limited to persons of sufficiently proximate relationship with the
direct victim, but that the measure of whether a relationship was sufficiently proximate was
not to be limited by reference to particular relationships but by ties of love and affection
which would be proved in each case).
(Vol. 38
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American courts have been inconsistent in their decisions on whether
relationships which are not on the list but which are de facto identical to
those relationships should be similarly treated by the courts." Gay men and
lesbians are rarely included on lists of restriction and suffer when it is their
partner who is a victim. The absence of this right has become the focus of
public attention in two different contexts-wrongful death actions and
visitation and custody rights.
1. Wrongful Death Actions
On January 26, 2001, Diane Whipple was mauled to death by two Presa
Canario dogs with a combined weight of 230 pounds." The tragedy is awash
with dramatic embellishments bordering on the absurd: the dogs belonged to
white supremacists serving time for murder and robbery, and were then in
the possession of their attorneys. The full story includes numerous unattrac-
tive details concerning these attorneys, Marjorie Knoller and Robert Noel,
who reveal themselves to be poor representatives of the legal profession, in-
cluding adopting the convicted murderer soon after Whipple's death, and
suggesting that because Whipple was an Olympic athlete in training, she
might have been taking steroids that made her a target of the dogs' aggres-
sive attacks." Adding insult to injury, the puppies of the murdering dog have
been advertised at the price of $1,200 each, with their murderous lineage
proudly underscored to justify the price. 7
"If Whipple had been married, her husband would be able to bring a
wrongful death action against the dog's owners. But Whipple was a lesbian
and her partner of seven years, Sharon Smith, may be left without any legal
recourse."' 8 Smith's legal battle to earn the right to file a wrongful death ac-
tion may "draw attention to the Catch-22 many gay couples find themselves
in when it comes to legal right for their partners."" Because the relationship
14. Compare, for example, the dissimilar treatment given to unmarried but cohabitating
heterosexual partners who view the death of their partners through the negligence of another:
Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1993) (unmarried cohabitants should be afforded the
protections of bystander liability for the negligent infliction of emotional injury) with Elden v.
Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (allowing unmarried cohabitants to recover damages for
bystander emotional distress would undermine the state's interest in promoting marriage).
15. John Gallagher, Looking for Meaning in Tragedy. N0 836 TilE ADVOCATE 45 (Apr.
24, 2001).
16. Id.
17. See Mubarak Dahir, Lesbian's Death Becomes Selling Point for Dogs. 14(26)
SourHmNx VoIcE20 (Aug. 9, 2001).
18. Tamsen Love, Mauling May Lead to Lawsuit by Gay Partner. 14(2) Sounims
VOICE 12 (Feb. 22, 2001).
19. Id. See also Deb Price, Tragedy Meets Inequity, Tim TL'UMS-PICAYUSE (New Or-
leans), May 8, 2001, at B5. This dilemma is technically not a Catch-22. A more fitting exam-
ple occurs in the military's claim that they cannot protect their gay service people from har-
assment unless they report the harassment. But to report the harassment is to violate the
"don't ask, don't tell" military policy on homosexuality. Therefore, they can either silently
20011
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was not officially recognized by California, Smith lacked established legal
standing to bring the wrongful death action. In other words, because she was
not on the "list," she presumptively could not bring this kind of suit, leading
the defendants to respond with a demurrer to her claim. She therefore chal-
lenged the law in court, seeking to have persons in her position put on this
list of restriction. In a ruling heralded as "the first decision of this kind, not
only in California but anywhere in the country,""° the Superior Court judge
agreed that failing to extend the surviving-spouse rule to same-sex couples
would violate the equal protection clause of California's constitution.2 ' An
appeal can be expected.
2. Visitation and Custody Suits
Custody and visitation suits provide a second example of lists of restric-
tion, and further illustrate the important life issues that hinge on whether one
is or is not "on the list." The case of A.B. will be referred to often in subse-
quent discussion.
In a recent Illinois decision on child visitation, A.B., the former lesbian
partner of eleven years with H.L., petitioned for visitation privileges with
C.B.L., the minor child that H.L. had conceived and delivered in 1993. A.B.
"was dutifully involved in all of the preparations prior to the birth [and) was
also equally involved in the care of C.B.L. for the next year-and-a-half" be-
fore the relationship ended in 1995.2 A.B. argued that by virtue of her status
as the former lesbian life partner of the respondent she should be recognized
as a common law de facto parent of C.B.L. and allowed visitation with the
child.
The appellate court rejected this reasoning. "A statute which concerns
an area formerly covered by the common law, such as section 607 of the
Marriage Act,23 'should be construed as adopting the common law unless
there is clear and specific language showing a change in the common law
was intended by the legislature."'24 Since its enactment in 1977, Section 607
had been extensively revised and expanded, such that it could no longer be
understood as "a simple, straight-forward codification of the common law of
parental visitation."2 Instead, it must be understood "as a statutory provision
intended by our General Assembly to supersede and supplant the common
endure the harassment and not tell, or tell and be subjected to further harassment in the form
of forcible discharge.
20. Peter Hartlaub, Same-Sex Partner can Sue for Damages, SAN FRANCISCO CIRONICILE,
July 28, 2001, at AI (quoting Shannon Minter, Smith's attorney).
21. Id.
22. In re the Matter of Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 317 (111. App. Ct. 1999)
23. 750 IL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (1998).
24. C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 318 (quoting Proud v. W.S. Bills & Sons, Inc.. 255 N.E.2d (111.
App. Ct. 1970)).
25. C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 319.
[Vol. 38
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law of visitation of Illinois. Consequently to contend that the common law
affords her standing to petition for visitation with C.B.L., as petitioner does,
is without merit." 6
The problem for A.B. was that the text of Section 607 explicitly lists
those relatives of a minor child who are entitled to visitation privileges: par-
ents, grandparents, great-grandparents, siblings, and step-parents." Since
"lesbian life partner" falls into none of these categories, A.B. was pre-
cluded by the overt language of Section 607 from requesting visitation privi-
leges; hence her attempt to expand the list via her failed resort to the claim
of "common law de facto parent."" Her argument that "lesbian life partner"
contains essential emotional elements identical to "parent" or at least "step-
parent" could not defeat the literalist stance that only the formal relationship
was important; in Illinois form trumps substance.
B. Lists of Inclusion
Lists of restriction privilege some groups over others. The opposite is
intended by lists of inclusion, which are designed to equalize the grant of
rights between the privileged and the disadvantaged. The goal of these lists
is to correct the shortfall in the natural distribution of social rights. "Getting
on the list" can be very important to any group that views itself as somehow
disadvantaged relative to other groups identified within society.
The prototypical example of the list of inclusion involves employment
discrimination. Employment discrimination is expressly prohibited against
those groups that have made it to the list. The contention is that those not on
the list are not in special need for protection. Evidence supporting the need
for these protections to be extended to gays is easily found." The most pub-
26. Id. at 320.
27. 750 IL. CoMP. STAT. 5/607(a), (b) (1998).
28. Gay men and lesbians have experimented with a variety of terms with which to refer
to their significant other (including "significant other"). "Lover" tends to overemphasize the
sexual component of the relationship. "Friend" or "companion" underemphasizes the physi-
cally expressive element. All these terms, and others besides, are currently in use. "Partner"
may perhaps be the most prevalent label today. Used alone, however, it can cause confusion.
as one scene in the movie American Beauty underscored: Those "out of the loop" presume the
person is a business partner. "Life partner" removes that ambiguity, and emphasizes the most
important dimension of the relationship, the mutual commitment for "life."
29. C.B.L, 723 N.E.2d at 318.
30 See generally ANNET FRISKOPP & SHARON SILVERSTEIN. STRAIGHT JOBS, GAY
LivEs (1995). For example, a 1987-88 survey of employers in Anchorage. Alaska, found that
18% would fire a known homosexual, 27% would not hire a known homosexual, and 26%
would not promote a known homosexual. BENNErr L. SINGER & DAVID DescHAtps, GAY &
LESBIAN' STATS (1994) (citing JAMES D. WOODS & JAY H. LucAs, THE CORPORATE CLOSET:
THE PROFESSIONAL LIVES OF GAY MEN IN AMERICA (1993)). Seventeen percent of lesbian,
gay, and bisexual physicians "were refused medical privileges, fired or denied employment,
educational opportunities, or a promotion because of their sexual orientation." Sen. Comm. on
Labor & Human Resources, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994: Hearings on Sen.
2238, 103rd Cong. 64 (July 29, 1994) (prepared statement of Mary Frances Berry) (citing a
20011
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lic example arose when Senate Republicans blocked James Hormel's con-
firmation as the U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg because he was an openly
gay man."
A different incident has achieved folk status due perhaps to the combi-
nation of its wide publicity, early occurrence, and blatant bigotry. In 1991
the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain "adopted a hiring policy that . . .it would
no longer employ homosexuals."32 In pursuit of this policy the company fired
at least nine employees, including Cheryl Summerville.3 Elaborating on this
policy William A. Bridges, Cracker Barrel's vice president, described the
company as one "found[ed] on a 'concept of traditional American values,'
[and that] employment of homosexuals appeared to be inconsistent with
those values and the 'perceived values of our customer base.""'3 This senti-
ment is more common than many suppose. Cracker Barrel was exceptional
only in its forthright expression. Summerville's "separation notice from
Cracker Barrel read: 'This employee is being terminated due to violation of
company policy. This employee is gay.""'3 Although Cracker Barrel later re-
scinded the policy, it did not rehire the employees fired under it. 6 The public
response of boycotts and sit-ins which this overt bigotry prompted has been
retold in a recent HBO documentary. 7
The inclusion of gay men and lesbians on a list of those to whom em-
ployment protections are extended would make cases such as Hormel and
Summerville rare, and grant the victims legal redress currently unavailable
to them.
survey by the American Association of Physicians for Human Rights).
The Los Angeles County Bar Association reported that "one in seven attorneys reported
that his or her employer engaged in some form of anti-gay discrimination in the recruitment
and hiring of attorneys" and that "gay attorneys are less likely to become law firm partners.
Id. at 66. The same report found that among heterosexual lawyers with 10 or more years in
practice, 41 percent earn over $125,000 per year and only 25 percent earn under $75.000.
while among their gay peers, the numbers are almost reversed, with only 27 percent earning
over $125,000, but 44 percent earning under $75,000. Id.
The National Commission for Employment Policy estimates that every year an estimated
42,000 individuals suffer from employment discrimination because of their sexual orientation.
Id. at 69. Appendix I to this hearing, provided by Chai Feldblum, summarizes the leading
court cases on the issue of employment discrimination against gay men and lesbians.
31. Chris Bull, A Philanthropist's Trial by Fire, N' 768 THE ADVOCA-ri 22 (Sept. 15,
1998); Philip Shenon, Senator Blocks All Clinton's Nominees: Oklahoman Blasts Gay Anm-
bassador, THETvMEs-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 9, 1999, at A9.
32. Ronald Smothers, Restaurant Rescinds Ban on Hiring Gays, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Mar. 4, 1991, at B6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Sen. Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1994: Hearings on Sen. 2238, 103rd Cong. 6 (July 29, 1994) (testimony of Cheryl Summer-
ville).
36. Smothers, supra note 32.
37. Out at Work (Anderson Gold Films, 1998)(videotape).
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II. THREE ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE LIST
Regardless of which type of list is involved, the struggle for gays' rights
in the legal realm often founders on this problem of "the list." Each list un-
doubtedly has its own rationale for existing at all, and for taking the particu-
lar form that it does. Many of these, examined in isolation, might seem rea-
sonable and justified. Excluding gay men and lesbians was probably the goal
of only some of them. Those who formulated other lists simply lacked the
vision to allow for the expansion of law into new areas, to address new prob-
lems and incorporate excluded categories. Whatever the genesis of a particu-
lar list, the immediate question for rights strategists is how to respond to it.
A. Strategy 1: Do Nothing
One possibility is simply to hunker down and hope that the judicial sys-
tem, given an adequate occasion, will construe the law in a way that gener-
ates a favorable outcome. But this tactic is highly capricious and unreliable.
For example, the Illinois court was not unsympathetic to A.B., noting that it
was "not unmindful of the fact that our evolving social structures have cre-
ated non-traditional relationships."3 Yet it still refused to take the step nec-
essary to permit A.B. to visit the child." By contrast, on an almost identical
set of facts, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached the opposite conclu-
sion.' In that case, a lesbian couple of thirteen years artificially conceived,
birthed, and raised Baby O.M., but separated three years later. Working
within a slightly more flexible legal context, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court upheld the woman's right to visit her ex-partner's son due to her status
as a "de facto" parent, precisely the status the Illinois court refused to recog-
nize in A.B.
While the particulars of the Massachusetts legal code permitted this out-
come' they did not demand it. Indeed, the dissenting opinion points out that
38. In re the Matter of Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
39. A California court declined to grant visitation to a former lesbian partner in these
words: "Plaintiff continues, '[T]he judiciary's function is to confront controversy. With or
without appropriate legislation, the courts [must] resolve disputes regarding the care of chil-
dren in non-traditional families....' Plaintiff misconstrues the role of the judiciary as an in-
novator of social policy." Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597 (1990).
40. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). See also V.C. v. M.J.B.. 748 A.2d
539 (N.J. 2000) (former lesbian partner was a "psychological parent" and as such "stands in
parity with the legal parent" on matters of visitation). This case is reviewed and contextual-
ized by Eric K.M. Yater, V.C. v. M.J.B.: The New Jersey Supreme Court Recognizes the Pa-
rental Role of a Nonbiological Lesbian "Mother" but Grants Her Only Visitation Rights, 10
TuL. J.L. & SEXUALrrY 299 (2001). This case prompted a legislative attempt to overturn the
New Jersey State Supreme Court. Kathleen Cannon, Bill Overturning Supreme Court Lesbian
Custody Ruling Stalls in Assembly, Associated Press (Sept. 21. 2000).
41. "Jurisdictions that have reached the opposite result differ from ours because their
statutory law supplants the equitable powers of their courts." E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d
at 893.
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"[a]lthough the law of the Commonwealth has never recognized [the de facto
parent], and indeed in [an earlier case] in effect rejected it, the court dis-
cusses its application here as though it were neither new nor remarkable.""
The judges' disagreement sprang wholly from the fact that while the dissent
deems it determinative that the woman was "legally a stranger to the mother-
child relationship," the majority judged pivotal the fact that she was not ac-
tually a stranger to that relationship; the boy, in fact, called her "Mommy."
In Massachusetts substance triumphed over form.
The opinion of the dissenter is cold but not unreasonable, and the out-
come could have easily been other than it was. The point is that if gay lead-
ers do nothing, simply trusting in the system to grope its way toward the
(from our perspective) correct outcome, that end may never be achieved, and
even if it does we will suffer massive personal casualties along the way.
B. Strategy 2: Seek Coverage under the Existing List
With so much at stake, we can ill-afford the laissez-faire attitude of the
first strategy given its uncertain outcome and high personal costs. Active
prodding is probably a better response in the long run to these important is-
sues, and accordingly strategic alternatives 2 and 3 adopt a more interven-
tionist posture.
Strategy 2 endeavors to make it easier for gay men and lesbians to fulfill
the terms for inclusion within the categories already on the list. For example,
the Supreme Court of Vermont has ruled that homosexual couples could not
be denied rights and benefits afforded heterosexual couples, leaving it to the
legislature to decide how such parity should be achieved. 3 On April 26,
2000, the Vermont Legislature responded by approving the recognition of
same-sex "civil unions."' "While a system of civil unions does not bestow
42. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d at 896 (Fried, J., dissenting).
43. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
44. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, Act No. 91, H. 847 (April 26, 2000). Although a
praiseworthy and courageous step, the establishment of civil unions may not completely sat-
isfy the judicial mandate. The Court ruled that
the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common
benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this
ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a
parallel "domestic partnership" system or some equivalent statutory alternative,
rests with the legislature.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
Certainly "common benefits" in ordinary parlance have a greater extension than legal
benefits. One of the nonlegal common benefits of marriage is the social approval and support
extended to the married couple. See Andrew Sullivan, Why "Civil Union" Isn't Marriage,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, at 18 (marriage is not merely an accumulation of benefits.
It is a fundamental mark of citizenship). This social support is demonstrated in innumerable
little gestures, all of which instantiate the presumption that the couple is a couple and that
their couplehood is presumed to be permanent. See also James M. Donovan, An Ethical Ar-
gument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex Partners, 8 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY
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the status of civil marriage, it does satisfy the requirements of the Common
Benefits Clause [of the Vermont Constitution]." If such a scheme had been
available in Illinois, and had A.B. and H.L. participated in it, conceivably the
existence of that civil union would have satisfied the criteria for at least step-
parent status and thereby entitled A.B. to visitation with C.B.L.
The implementation of Strategy 2 requires three steps: (1) if the targeted
status (in A.B.'s case, that of step-parent) is not already recognized in visita-
tion law, that option must be established; (2) the creation of a domestic part-
nership scheme which endows full and complete legal equality between ho-
mosexual couples and their heterosexual counterparts; and (3) the judicial or
legislative recognition that the entering into a domestic partnership endows
status (e.g., as a step-parent) entitling the holder to visitation privileges even
against the biological parent's wishes. Steps two and three are particularly
contentious in today's society. Indeed, forces have mobilized to rescind the
Vermont civil union law.' Although unsuccessful, the attempt warns that not
only can progress be slow, requiring many years to achieve were this strat-
egy pursued, but also that what little success is achieved will be tenuous and
uncertain.
649 (1998).
Even the most generous "domestic partnership" solution could only provide all the legal
benefits of marriage in Vermont. The couple would still be deprived of the common benefit of
cultural encouragement. An analogy might be helpful: It is as if a law had been passed
proclaiming that bastards are not to suffer for that fact. On the one hand it extends protections
to the illegitimate so it can be claimed to be a unifying law; on the other, it ensconces
"bastard" as a legitimate social category. Such laws remove the overt legal penalties for being
a second-class citizen while reinforcing the social stigma of being second-class.
Likewise, civil unions may remove much of the economic costs of being unable to marry.
But the mere fact that sectors of society are so exercised to keep heterosexual couplings dis-
tinct from homosexual couplings demonstrates that they are not the same. See The Editors,
Separate but Equal? THE NEw REPUBUC, Jan. 10, 2000, at 9; Deb Price, Separate but Equal
Policy is Never Fair, DETROrr Nnvs, Feb. 28, 2000; Steve Bryant & Demian, Marrying
Apartheid, Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, May 1999, available at
www.buddybuddy.com/mar-apar.html; Carol Ness, "Domestic Dilemmas," SA,' FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, Jan. 9, 2000, at Al.
Members of the Vermont House expressed similar reservations: "'Saying that anything
other than marriage was inadequate, [Progressive Rep. Steve Hingtgen] said that domestic
partnerships would validate hate. 'It institutionalizes the bigotry and affirmatively creates an
apartheid system of family recognition in Vermont."' Barbara Dozetos, Vermont DP Measure
Should be on House Floor by March 7, BAY WINDOwS, Feb. 17. 2000.
Baker's dissenting opinion notes that the Vermont Court has previously acknowledged
that "damage" resulting from invidious classification can extend the economic and legal and
into the symbolic and psychological. Baker, 744 A.2d at 899 n.2 (Johnson. J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Anything short of inclusion within the Vermont marriage laws. then.
would fall short of extending to same-sex couples the full complement of common benefits
attached to marriage, contravening the Baker court's mandate.
45. Summary of H.847 as Passed by the General Assembly, House of Representatives,
Vermont State House, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/h-847sum.htm.
46. Ross Sneyd, Repeal of Vermont Civil Unions Law Gains, TttE RECORD (Bergen
County, NJ), May 24, 2001, at A15.
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C. Strategy 3: Eliminate or Expand the List
A second proactive strategy that rights advocates could pursue as the
more secure approach is to campaign to have the list eliminated or changed,
rather than to seek inclusion under its present form. If Strategy 2 seeks ways
to massage "non-traditional relationships" so that they legally look like tradi-
tional relationships (i.e., "lesbian life partner" becomes translated into "step-
parent"), Strategy 3 hopes to revise laws to recognize these relationships in
all their non-traditional glory. In other words, that same-sex couples possess
intrinsic value, and not merely social instrumental value by virtue of their
analogy with opposite-sex couples: "lesbian life partner" is accorded rights
and recognition on its own merits, and not because it "looks like" heterosex-
ual step-parenthood.
Two paths toward achieving Strategy 3 easily present themselves. The
first option fundamentally rewrites the relevant laws so that they delete ex-
plicit lists, substituting nominal categories with administrative guidelines in
the form of principles and characteristics. The second option is less subtle,
striving merely to have gay men and lesbians included explicitly on preexist-
ing lists.
1. Reframe the List in Abstract Terms
Lists are appended to laws to guide in their application. They function to
bring the intangibles expressed in the laws down into the "real world." These
laws are commonly expressed in terms of values and principles (e.g., equal
protection, fair treatment, etc.), while the list provides exemplars of the real
world beneficiaries of those values and principles.
The first option toward achieving Strategy 3 reconceptualizes the list
from one of examples to one of indicia. The revised list would not itemize
by name the groups embraced by the law, but instead would describe or
characterize the attributes of the intended beneficiaries of the law. As ap-
plied to the custody scenario, the better law describes the relevant traits that
characterize visitation-worthy relationships without taking note of or enu-
merating any specific forms which may embody those traits.
This option was applied in a Washington State visitation law which
"permits anyone, without any defined relationship to the child, to petition for
visiting rights and to succeed if that family court concludes that visitation
would be in the child's best interest." 7 Opponents of the law argued before
the United States Supreme Court that such sweeping visitation violates
"a parent's constitutionally protected right to rear his or her children with-
out state interference." In the absence of any indication that visitation was
47. Linda Greenhouse, Case Prompts Debate over What 'Family' Is, TIMES-PICAYUNF
(NEw ORLEANS), Jan. 5, 2000, at A3. See also Joseph P. Shapiro, The Right to Be a Relative,
128(2) U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT 46 (Jan. 17, 2000).
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necessary to prevent harm to the child, the parents' rights were "funda-
mental" and should not be overridden, the [Washington Supreme Court]
said,' adding that "the parents should be the ones to choose whether to
expose their children to certain people or ideas." 9
Each side of this debate invoked a different standard: Proponents of the law
said that anyone should be able to visit over the custodial parent's objections
if it is to the child's (state-determined) good; opponents argued that visita-
tion should be denied unless the denial clearly inflicts on the child a (state-
determined) harm. The United States Supreme Court sided with the latter.'
While some might expect gay men and lesbians to favor the broad visi-
tation scheme of the Washington law because it clearly encompasses the
needs of former gay partners such as A.B., the primary voice of our interests
within the courts, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, sided
with those who felt the Washington statute was unconstitutionally broad.
Even if some ex-partners of same-sex couples could claim privileges under
this code section, so too could it be used by those opposed to children being
in the care of homosexuals to insert themselves into these otherwise happy
families.
Lambda Legal desired a middle ground that was on the one hand flexi-
ble enough to accommodate the visitation needs of nontraditional family
units, but rigid enough to distinguish between those who have a genuine in-
terest in this regard from those who do not. The "entry-level test" suggested
by Lambda Legal collapsed the four indicia articulated in the earlier case of
Custody of H.S.H.-K.:
To demonstrate the existence of the petitioner's parent-like relationship
with the child, the petitioner must prove four elements: (1) that the bio-
logical or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's for-
mation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2)
that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3)
that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant
responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including
contributing toward the child's support, without expectation of future fi-
nancial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental
role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature."
48. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998).
49. Greenhouse, supra note 47 (quoting the Washington Supreme Court).
50. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000). The background and details of the case
are described in C.P. Dominic Ayotte, Troxel v. Granville: Parental Power to Determine As-
sociational Interests of Children, 52(4) BAYLOR L.R. 997 (2000).
51. Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). Compare this four point stan-
dard with the following offered by Lambda Legal:
One way this may be accomplished would be to require petitioners to demonstrate
(1) the curtailment of a significant relationship with the children of a quality and
depth that sets petitioners apart from the many people, even blood relatives, with
whom children have positive, loving relationships, coupled with 92) a showing of
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The lesson from Troxel is that a textually-minimalist approach that es-
chews lists, as did this Washington statute, presents its own kinds of uphill
battles for the gays' rights strategist and incurs costs for the community as a
whole. Flexibility can be a double-edged sword.
Lambda Legal's reaction to the statute also illustrates a second point.
Lists remove ambiguity, telling people from which direction potential trou-
ble might come.52 Lambda Legal would exchange a chaotic ambiguity for a
list, although one which specifies indicia of applicability rather than a rigid
typology of recognized social categories. The lesson seems to be that the
predilection for predictability will tend to generate lists even when the law
originally lacked them. For example, although the requirement that strict
scrutiny be applied in cases of potential discrimination does not include a list
of the characteristics which trigger this level of scrutiny, the list of cases in
which it has been applied is typically read as the exhaustive list of situations
when it should be applied. This restricted reading implies that if a trait is not
prior parental knowledge and fostering of the relationship that allowed it to grow
in importance to a child.
Troxel v. Granville, Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Gay and Les-
bian Advocates and Defenders as amici curiae in support of respondent.
The Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville did not address the question of the criteria justi-
fying a third party's successful suit for visitation. The language of the decision presumes that
the custodial adult is a biological parent, and that the request for visitation comes from a non-
parent who had no significant ongoing parental responsibilities for the child. Despite the wish
of Lambda Legal that Troxel render a result that would be beneficial in some way to gays and
lesbians, very little here seems pertinent. Supportive dicta, albeit by inference, occur in the
dissent by Justice Stevens: "The almost infinite variety of family relationships that pervade
our ever-changing society strongly counsels against the creation by this court of a constitu-
tional rule that treats a biological parent's liberty interest in the care and supervision of her
child as an isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily." Id. at 2073. Justice Kennedy, in
his dissent, expresses similar reservations:
the holding seems to proceed from the assumption that the parent or parents who
resist visitation have always been the child's primary caregivers and that the third
parties who seek visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with the
child.... Cases are sure to arise-perhaps a substantial number of cases-in
which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period of time.
has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject to abso-
lute parental veto."
Id. at 2077.
52. See Wolfgang Holdheim, A Hermeneutic Thinker, 16(6) CARDOZO L.R. 2153. 2155
(1995): "The urge for an obsessive minuteness and a total precision expresses the vain desire
to prejudge everything, to leave no gaps, to catch all of reality in the web of a comprehensive
system, so that interpretation may be avoided and conclusions simply 'read off."'
According to at least one commentator, exactly this problem afflicts the 1996 Immigration
Act: "It sets out to eliminate all judgment, all weighing of individual factors, making deporta-
tion automatic." This decision is reached mechanically by consulting a "long list of crimes"
which, if the alien has committed one, require deportation. As with other instances of list m-
crementalism, this combination of attempted exhaustiveness and mechanical application has
generated counterintuitive outcomes. Anthony Lewis, Unjust Law Gives No Second Chances,
TIlE TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEw ORLEANS), Feb. 22, 2000, at B5.
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on the list (e.g., sexual orientation) then presumptively it is not entitled to
that level of scrutiny against discrimination. What is actually only an histori-
cal fact (e.g., sexual orientation has not been subjected to strict scrutiny) is
invoked as an ethical prescription (sexual orientation should not be subjected
to strict scrutiny) and enforced as a practical limit (sexual orientation cannot
be subjected to strict scrutiny). The "is" has become an "ought," with all the
philosophical trouble that that slippage triggers. In practice this shortcut re-
veals itself when lawyers approaching new situations tend to examine the in-
terpretive list rather than the statute that incidentally generated the list.
The simple fact is that many people are comfortable with lists, prefer-
ring them to the uncertainty a more open-ended approach creates." Quite
possibly persons would prefer to know with certainty that they are not in-
cluded on important lists, so that they can plan accordingly, than to live in
53. An interesting tension between incrementalist and nonincremcntalist strategies can be
pieced together from several rights debates. On the one hand. some jurisdictions seek to ex-
pand the list of protected traits. The "Dignity for All Students Act" in fact does not apply to
all students, but only to those targeted because of "real or perceived race, ethnicity, national
origin, religion, sex gender, sexual orientation, or mental or physical disability." Dignity for
All Students Act Clears New York State Legislative Committee, Nrw YORK BLADE. May 26,
2000.
The list is even longer in the proposal made in Royal Oak, Michigan. City commissioner
Laura Harrison "would like to see an ordinance in Royal Oak similar to one being considered
in Ferndale. Ferndale's proposal makes it illegal for employers, merchants and local groups to
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, age, height or weight, marital status.
sexual orientation, familial status, national origin or physical or mental disability." Nicole
Bondi, Royal Oak Considers Rights Law, Dmtorr NEws, Nov. 17, 1999. Again. the pur-
ported goal is to ensure "equal treatment for everyone," although the law in fact applies only
to those categories on the list. After a long and contentious public struggle, voters rejected the
measure by a 2-to-I margin. Bill Laitner, Voters Defeat Hunian-Rights Proposal, DETorr
FREE PRESS, May 16, 2001.
In Dayton, city officials balked at expanding the list of protected groups to include gays
and lesbians, and instead offered an alternative resolution "stating the city's opposition to all
discrimination, including that against gays." James Hannah, Dayton Rejects Proposed Law for
Gay Rights, AssOciATED PRESS, Dec. 23, 1999. Here the incrementalist/nonincrementalist
strategies are not balanced: The incrementalist list which excludes gays is law, while the non-
incrementalist universal prohibition is only "an informal resolution."
This contrast is more meaningfully played out when Maryland state education officials
similarly rejected new incrementalist inclusions on the list of protected groups, instead offer-
ing an alternative regulation which bans "harassment of all students, without specifying any
individual groups." "Department officials and board members ended up questioning the wis-
dom of specifying that some particular groups, and not others, were to be protected from har-
assment." Amy Argetsinger, Outcry Stalls Schools' New Anti-Ilarassinent Policy. WASt.
PosT, Aug. 26, 1999, at M6.
The irony is that this all-inclusive policy was "stalled" not by conservatives who thought
it was too broad, but by liberals who felt it was too vague. "If you don't have the guts to put
the words 'sexual orientation' in there, we don't believe you'll have the guts to protect us."
Amy Argetsinger, Harassment Policy tnder Attack, WAS1I. PosT, Oct. 27. 1999, at B9. So the
confusing outcome can be that incrementalist strategies are pressed under the banner of uni-
versal inclusion, yet when universal inclusion is aimed at directly, incrementalists demand
that the whole be parsed into identified subgroups. We see here the first hints that incremen-
talism is not a different route to the same end of equality even though it claims that it is; in-
stead, incrementalism is a method to achieve an entirely different result.
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doubt about whether the protections of the lists extend to them." The point,
easily summarized, is that lists, for reasons of human psychology, have a
tendency to sprout up even when overtly excluded. A rights strategy that
aimed toward the elimination of lists in legislation would therefore only be
temporarily effective because lists would develop anyway, in interpretation
and application of the law if no longer in the law itself.
2. Extend the List Explicitly to Include Gay Men and Lesbians
We have yet to identify an adequate response to the problem of the list.
It is too important and costly to ignore, and against the grain of human psy-
chology to hope to permanently eliminate. The final strategic option works
to amend the laws or judicial precedents. This approach accepts the inevita-
bility of the list, and simply aims to have gay men and lesbians explicitly
added to it. To many this strategy is self-evidently the most reasonable
course of action. This strategic response to the problem of the list-to work
to have our names directly appended-is immensely compelling if it can
claim at least prima facie feasibility. Since the alternative strategies we have
reviewed are meager options right out of the gate, we are especially eager for
this final one, so attractive at first glance, to survive scrutiny.
A recent effort of this sort from a hopeful for the 2000 Democratic
Presidential nomination, Bill Bradley, received wide public attention. I-le
proposed, as a way to "support [...] all of us, [to support] broadening our
humanity" that we "should add sexual orientation to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. That would clearly indicate that discrimination against gays is in the
same category as discrimination against other protected groups."" This sug-
gestion was energetically rejected by civil rights leaders, including Barney
Frank, the gay Congressman from Massachusetts. 6 A primary objection to
Bradley's proposal was that if this important list can be amended for good, it
can also be amended for ill." Better in the long run, then, to leave the list in-
violate and not set a precedent by re-opening the discussion on civil rights at
such a fundamental level.
54. John Bowen provides a vivid example of this principle. The Puritans believed that
the elect of God were preordained, but also that no one knew if he or she were included in that
number. "Even the most highly placed church member could not easily escape gnawing
doubts as to the reliability of his or her own certainty. One story has it that a woman in a Bos-
ton congregation, tormented by her uncertainty, threw her child into a well to seek relief of
certain damnation." JOHN R. BOWEN, RELIGIONS IN PRACTICE: AN APPROACH To THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION 95 (1998). The certainty of hell is often better endured than
doubts about heaven.
55. Chris Bull, Bill Bradley Wants You!, N° 796 THE ADVOCATE 26, 31 (Oct. 12. 1999).
56. Anne E. Kornblut, A Bradley Plan for Gays Irks Rights Leaders, BOSTON GLOBE.
Sept. 21, 1999, at A14; Barney Frank, Letter to the Editor, LESBIAN & GAY NEW YORK
ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2000.
57. An additional objection is that inclusion on this particular list is tantamount to asking
for quotas and special considerations accorded racial minorities. The gays' rights movement,
however, aims toward non-discrimination, not toward "special rights."
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The real problem of this strategy lies deeper. Although society may not
be able to swallow whole the bitter pill of true equality, the argument goes, it
can eventually achieve this goal if the pill is parsed into more manageable
bits.58 The realist adapts to this need to turn the ship of state slowly. It is all
good and well to be a high-principled idealist, the advocates of this option
maintain, but there are practical forces afoot. High aspirations should be no
excuse for doing nothing at all if you cannot get everything you want right
away: recall Clinton's advice that the perfect not become the enemy of the
good. The real world, they urge, runs on mundane compromise, not grand
gestures. Taking what you can get at each moment allows the movement to
move, so that over time it arrives at the ideal place toward which society as-
pires.
At this pragmatic level, an appeal to add homosexuals to a list will
rarely succeed when argued in its own name. People frankly do not care that
much about us or what happens to us. Success comes when the addition of
gays to a list is seen as part of the completion of a broader vision of "equal-
ity" for all. In this light, the inclusion of gay men and lesbians becomes
merely the current phase in the gradual fulfillment of our society's self-
proclaimed commitment to these broader principles. As expressed by one
community member, "Many Americans do not understand that gay and les-
bian rights are part of a larger human rights equation."" List incrementalism
is a viable strategy only if it indeed furthers this larger goal of universal
equality.
The remainder of this article demonstrates that list incrementalism does
not, in fact, further this goal, and may in fact make it harder to realize. As
judged by the standard of advancing the goal of equality for all, incremental-
ism is both self-defeating and counterproductive. Even were that not the
case, list incrementalism is undesirable because it creates a different kind of
social environment than efforts to move en masse. One cannot be offered as
a reasonable alternative to the other. They are two contradictory visions of
the final result, not alternative strategies toward the same end.
The remaining sections elaborate the general themes already described.
First, theoretical apparatus in the form of Francis Lieber's legal hermeneu-
58. The Vermont civil unions have been argued to be acceptable in just these terms.
I feel that, as bitter a pill as it is, the Vermont legislature should be encouraged to pass its Jim
Crow domestic-partner law (and it should be characterized as such. so that there is no doubt
that it isn't anything but separate and unequal) which gives the intolerant and disappointingly
ignorant majority a little time to become accustomed to the idea that yes. our relationships are
as important, viable, worthy, and lasting as their own. Mark Ritzenhein. "Re: *M*: Startegy."
March 1, 2000 (a contribution to the MARRIAGE internet discussion group). TE
ADVOCATE's ReaderForum reflects this ambivalence toward the Vermont unions. While both
sides invoke the "separate but equal" image, proponents argue that "at least we're on the same
ride," while opponents declaim the move as unconstitutional: "As a gay man. I'm offended by
this law." N'814 THE ADVOCATE 6 (June 20, 2000).
59. Tim Newcomb, Winning Initiatives, 8(3) TimE GAY AND LESBIAN Re-vw 46
(May/June 2001).
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tics gives formal content to the idea that too much precision actually fosters
malicious ambiguity. If the list is intended to clarify this ambiguity, then it is
necessarily self-defeating. To expand the list to include gay men and lesbi-
ans consequently obfuscates the general principle behind the list and is
therefore a step away from the goal of equality for all. Second, the divergent
and incompatible implications of an incrementalist strategy and a non-
incrementalist (or wholesale) strategy are underscored by an examination of
the practical debate on employment non-discrimination. Third, the kinds of
rights that are philosophically defensible differ according to whether they
can be promoted piecemeal or wholesale, meaning that incrementalist and
nonincrementalist strategies inherently work toward different ends.
The argument that incrementalism is an alternative and progressive ap-
proach toward the same final outcome as that produced by "wholesale-ism"
is demonstrably false. This last response to the problem of the list is as
flawed as the others, and a fourth, nonincrementalist strategy must be
sought.
III. LIST INCREMENTALISM IS SELF-DEFEATING: THE FORMAL ANALYSIS
Proponents justify incrementalism by asserting that it advances larger
goals through discrete smaller steps. This strategy presumes that, as a list
expands incrementally, the list's increased detail clarifies the underlying
principles, such that its appropriate applications become more exhaustively
enumerated. As the meaning of the principles become more detailed and thus
better illustrated, their complete realization looms more immediately. As a
result, the better law is the more exhaustively explicit one.'
This section demonstrates that not only is this outcome unlikely, but in
fact, everything known about both human language and psychology leads us
to anticipate the opposite. Expanded lists in the name of precision do not
lead to clarity, but rather necessarily lead to greater confusion and vague-
ness. While the extension of civil rights to gay men and lesbians is predi-
cated on an argument that these rights belong to all people and that granting
these basic rights to gays is but one step in that wider civic endeavor, list in-
crementalism inherently decreases the likelihood of achieving that end.
60. One original proponent of this position was Aristotle: "Well-drawn laws should
themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision
of the judges." Rhetoric, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1317, 1326 (W. Rhys Roberts
trans, Richard McKeon ed., 1941). Aquinas later quotes this passage approvingly in his
Summa Theologica, Question 95, Reply to Objection 2, reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE &
PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPIIY Of LAW 165
(2d ed. 1995). Legal theorists who identify as intellectual descendents of either Aristotelian or
Aquinan jurisprudence, therefore, are vulnerable to this criticism.
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A. Francis Lieber's Legal Hermeneutics
According to Francis Lieber's influential Legal and Political Herme-
neutics,6' precision and clarity are mutually exclusive. Lieber applied the tex-
tual scrutiny typically reserved for philology and theology to the law. Com-
mon to several revolutionary writings, Lieber begins with extraordinarily
pedantic observations about language and communication. From these mea-
ger seeds grow powerful and counterintuitive implications.
Lieber first argued that "every single [statute], without exception" is in
need of interpretation and construction.' This necessity arises from two con-
siderations. The first consideration comes from the nature of language itself.
The "very nature and essence of human language, being, as we have seen,
not a direct communication of the minds, but a communion by intermediate
signs only, renders a total exclusion of every imaginable misapprehension, in
most cases, absolutely impossible."'' Lieber's point is that all communica-
tion is necessarily imperfect, contrary to the opinions of others that only un-
skilled or careless communication exchanges contain flaws.' Lieber denies
communicative perfection even as a theoretical possibility. Some minimal
amount of interpretation is always required, where "interpretation" is defined
61. FRANcIs LmBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTiCS. OR PRLNC'uPES OF
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND PoLITIcs, wmI REMARKS ON PRECEDENTS
AND AuTHoRTEs (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880), reprinted in 16 CARnDOZO L.R.
1901 (1995).
62. While this insight is not original to Lieber, he was perhaps the first legal scholar to
consider in detail its significance. A much earlier observation of this fact was made by James
Madison in the Federalist Papers:
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection
of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are
conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express
ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires no only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively ap-
propriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases
for every complex idea, or so correct as to include many equivocally denoting dif-
ferent ideas. Hence it must happen that however accurately objects may be dis-
criminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be con-
sidered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the
terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or
less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the Al-
mighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his mean-
ing, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium
through which it is communicated.
THm FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229-30 (James Madison) (Modem Library, 1937).
63. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 1903.
64. The argument for necessarily imperfect communication is made in more technical
terms by James M. Donovan and Brian A. Rundle, Psychic Unit) Constraints upon Successful
Intercultural Communication, 17(3) LANGUAGE & COMMUNICATION 219 (1997).
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as "the discovery of the true sense of words."'6 Hermeneutics is the study of
the rules and principles of "true and safe interpretation. '' 6
Even were perfect communicability possible between two interlocutors,
this would not remove the need for legal interpretation. Language is time-
sensitive, and this time sensitivity makes interpretation necessary. For ex-
ample, as any student of Shakespeare knows, a perfectly communicated
statement in Elizabethan England (even if that were possible) would require
interpretation today.67 Because societal assumptions" and word meanings
change over time, what was once clear gradually becomes obscure:
[T]he state of human society is continually changing, and ought to change,
according to its very principles of existence. This is a rule so well estab-
lished that statesmen and lawyers are now agreed upon the wisdom of
pointing out principles and drawing general outlines in a clear and easily
understood language. 69
By "clear and easily understood" Lieber refers to the meaning of what-
ever language, if any, which depends relatively less upon the peculiarities of
its specific temporal context. For example, the interpretation of "religion"
has varied significantly in our constitutional history,7" although perhaps less
so than an understanding of "marriage."7' But even restricting statutory lan-
guage to those terms and phrases which have been historically stable (and
this explains the continued reliance upon Latin in law, which, because it
lacks daily speakers, changes its meanings only very slowly) provides no as-
surances that semantic drift will not occur in the due course of time.
In sum, the ubiquitous need for interpretation and construction is over-
determined by both synchronic and diachronic causes.
65. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 1901.
66. Id. at 1912.
67. It is impossible to word laws in such a manner as to
absolutely exclude all doubt, or to allow us to dispense with construction, even if
they be worded for the time for which they were made, with absolute (mathemati-
cal) distinctness; because things and relations change, and because interests con-
flict differently with each other at different times.
Id. at 2000.
68. The importance of background assumptions is illustrated by Lieber's example of the
misleadingly simple directive from the housekeeper to the domestic, "fetch some soup meat."
Id. at 1904. The implicit knowledge required to understand and execute this command es-
capes exhaustive detailing. "Lieber's particular point is that it is at best unnecessary, perhaps
misleading, and in any event impossible to be comprehensive." Michael Herz, Rediscovering
Francis Lieber: An Aftenvord and Introduction, 16(6) CARDOZO L.R. 2107, 2129 (1995).
69. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 2027.
70. See James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition
of 'Religion,' 6(1) SETON HALLCONST. L.J. 23 (1995).
71. See generally LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND
1500-1800 (1979).
72. This same general point has been argued as long ago as Plato's Laws:
[Vol. 38
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss1/2
BABY STEPS OR ONE FELL SWOOP?
What cannot be avoided, however, can be minimized. One goal of good
laws should be to frame them so as to require the least amount of interpreta-
tion to discern the "true sense" of the language. The insight that is of most
concern here is that there is an inverse relationship between the effort to be
precise and the clarity of the product.3 In other words, utilizing more ex-
plicit language actually "increase[s], in fact, the chances of sinister interpre-
tation."'u On the contrary, the path to clarity is through plain speech," not
precise speech:76
Men have at length found out that little or nothing is gained by attempting
to speak with absolute clearness and endless specifications, but that human
speech is the clearer, the less we endeavor to supply by words and specifi-
cations that interpretation which common sense must give to human
words.'
Another balance [Plato] strikes is between fidelity to the letter of the law and dis-
cretion in its application. Magnesia is a "law state," and laws as instruments of
government are imperfect: They cannot meet the peculiar circumstances of every
case, and need interpretation and application by persons acting according to their
spirit rather than their bare wording. Hence although Plato is emphatic that the
Magnesians should give the laws unconditional obedience, he is well aware that
they will have to exercise enlightened flexibility in their day-to-day enforcement.
Trevor J. Saunders, Plato's Later Political Thought, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO
464,477 (1992).
73. Joseph Kimble, a leader in the Plain Language Movement for legal writing, dis-
agrees. He deems it a
stubborn myth that precision is incompatible with plain (or clear language .... The
truth is that drafters usually do not have to choose between one or the other "the
instances of actual conflict are much rarer than lawyers often suppose." What's
more, by aiming for both, the drafter will usually improve both.
Joseph Kimble, Answering the Critics of Plain Language. 5 SCRIBES JOURNAL OF LEGAL
WRmrNG 51, 53 (1994-95).
There is of course a sense in which both Lieber and Kimble are right. While evading a
detailed examination of the genuine points of agreement and disagreement, we can note that
while Lieber is more concerned with underscoring the implications of the inherent vagueness
of terms (which Kimble recognizes), Kimble's strongest attacks are against unintended, un-
necessary and preventable ambiguity and stultifyingly obtuse jargon. Id. at 79. This difference
of emphasis accounts in part for their seemingly contradictory conclusions.
74. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 1907.
75. Or more accurately, through relatively plain speech, since the claim that no speech or
text is ever actually plain in any absolute sense.
76. I have elsewhere argued that if laws are to be obeyed, legal language must be com-
prehensible to the persons expected to obey. The broader or more general the law, the more
ordinary should be the terms used within the law. "One should not have to go to law school to
be a law-abiding citizen." Donovan, God is as God Does, supra note 70. at 25 n.3.
77. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 1905. Other scholars have commented on the detrimental
impact of excess precision: "I do not believe that exactness or precision are intellectual values
in themselves; on the contrary, we should never try to be more exact or precise than the prob-
lem before us requires." KAR. R. PoPPER, OBicTIv- KNOWLEDGE 58 (1972).
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Rather than through excruciating detail that invites misunderstanding
over instances which are not explicitly specified and that may even defeat
the purported purpose of the legislation, identification of the "true sense" of
legal statutes must be through "common sense and good faith."' 8 Any at-
tempt to control for the fluidity of language by pinning down the meaning
with explanatory or illustrative details only introduces additional language
that fluctuates in its own turn. Either an infinite regress is begun, wherein
each compensatory addition requires corrections of its own, or else the
evolving semantics of the appended language overwhelms the meaning of
the original core statute.
As a result, because language is inherently vague or ambiguous, suc-
cumbing to the temptation to remove that vagueness or ambiguity results in
either of two undesirable outcomes. Either the additional detail minimizes
another desirable quality, clarity,79 or the effort to be more precise leads
paradoxically to even greater imprecision.08' Lieber believes that both these
78. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 1945. The legal corpus is replete with examples where
more harm than good has been done by attempts to define terms which previously lay within
the common understanding of culture participants. For example, "Courts have... interpreted
the word 'exclusively' to mean 'substantially."' Church of the Chosen People v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (D. Minn. 1982). If "exclusively" means substantially, what
word means exclusively? In another example of perverse overspecification to the point where
the original term now bears a legal sense at odds with the common understanding, is the Ten-
nessee law which defines "nudity" to include covered parts of the male body if they are "in a
discernibly turgid state." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-51 l(a)(2)(A) (1994).
79. For another example of the way one seemingly desirable goal can preclude another,
see FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: How
CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE (1996). The authors' thesis is that
efforts to eliminate the possibility of political graft and corruption among public officials has
undermined the ability of those officials to perform their designated functions: "in making it
difficult to steal the public's money, we made it virtually impossible to manage the public's
money." Id. at 186 (quoting David Osborne and Ted Gaebler). Anechiarico and Jacobs be-
lieve that
while corruption is never "acceptable" in a moral sense, some level of corruption is
a sociopolitical fact of life in all organizations-public, private, educational, or
philanthropic. Just as retailers consider some amount of "shrinkage" (theft) a cost
of doing business, the public and the public sector need to realize that every in-
stance of corruption does not require another layer of corruption-proofing.
Id. at 194. Not only do such attempts at "corruption-proofing" inevitably fail, but in the proc-
ess they remove from government the flexibility it needs to achieve socially desirable goals in
an efficient way.
80. Some goals, it seems, cannot be aimed at directly. Three examples follow. First. Ar-
istotle argued that pleasure is not something one successfully pursues in its own right.
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 342 (J.E.C. Welldon, trans., Prometheus, 1987).
Rather fun is "any unfrustrated activity that exercises our natural capacities." D.S. Hlutchin-
son, Ethics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 195, 211 (1995). Pleasure (or
"fun") is what accompanies the doing of something worth the doing, and is not something that
can be sought in its own right.
Second, to perform an act "for the sake of friendship" implicitly devalues the other party
of that relationship: "if I act for the sake of friendship... then my aim in acting is to get, sus-
tain, strengthen the friendship, rather than to act for the sake of the friend." Michael Stocker,
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problems can be avoided if the drafter relies upon the common sense and
good faith brought to the text by the reader, rather than to aspire vainly to
compose self-contained nuggets of meaning to whose comprehension the
reader contributes nothing.
B. Henneneutic Implications for List lncrementalism
The relevance of Lieber's hermeneutics to the present problem should
be obvious. List incrementalism employs a belief that explicitly articulated
detail in law is, if not an optimal strategy, at least a helpful one. Lieber
would deny both of these assumptions.' Lists are neither good nor helpful.
Gays should think twice before rushing to add themselves to any legal list.
To illustrate this point, one can examine the difficulties of defining the
ethnic label "Hispanic." This demographic category has become increasingly
contested but is of great significance in our administrative law." Below are
three attempts to define the noun:
Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship. in FRtENDsHiP A
PHImosoPHIcAL READER 245, 253 (1993). To aim at friendship, even if it is commendable by
other standards, is inherently unfriendly. And third, Nathan Glazer has concluded that "Our
efforts to deal with distress are themselves increasing distress." NATHAN GLAzER, THE Li~rrs
OF SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1988).
81. As I employ the terms, clarity and precision are related but distinguishable traits.
Clarity relates to the effort needed to discern what is in the text itself. Precision refers to the
congruency between what the text says and what it is meant to say. A text loses clarity when
its meaning requires more work to find. A text loses precision to the extent that less of its
meaning is in the text to begin with. More detail can lead to either reduced clarity or increased
imprecision.
82. A contemporary advocate of this position is Philip IC Howard. In exasperated tones
he recounts the rise since 1970 of the legal ethos that "the highest art in American lawmaking
is precision.... By the crafting of words, lawmakers will anticipate every situation, every
exception." PHIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF Co=NoN SENSE 29 (1994). One articulated
defense of that position can be found in Jack Stark, Should the Main Goal of Statutory Draft-
ing be Accuracy or Clarity?, 15 STATuTE L.R. 207 (1994). His own answer to the title's ques-
tion is that concerns for accuracy, or precision, should predominate over clarity.
This pursuit for the holy grail of perfectly precise statutory language, Howard feels, has
"become almost a religious tenet." PHuiP K. HOWARD, TIE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE 10
(1994). The goal is that "The words of the law will tell us exactly what to do. Judgment is
foreclosed not simply by the language of the words. It is also foreclosed by the belief that
judgment has no place in the application of law." Id. at 18. He illustrates the practical out-
come by noting that the forestry rules which could once be carried in a shirt pocket now con-
sume seven volumes, and the thirty-three page long specification for a "hammer." Id. at 11,
68. "The more precise the rule," he concludes, "the less sensible the law seems to be." Id. at
15. The reason for this dismal state is that "we have constructed a system of regulatory law
that basically outlaws common sense." Id. at 11.
In other words, the very elements Lieber identifies as necessary to the just interpretation
and application of the law, "common sense and good faith," are exactly those expectations
which have been unfashionable if not illegal.
83. Policy Monitor, Who is Hispanic?, 41(9) ANTHROPOLOGY NEws 23 (Dec. 2000).
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Hispanic: a usually Spanish-speaking person of Latin American origin
who lives in the U.S.
84
In our usage of the term we are referring to all people of Spanish Speak-
ing/Surname origin residing in the United States or Puerto Rico. Accord-
ingly, Hispanic is a generic term which includes Cuban Americans, Mexi-
can Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other Central or South American
origin groups.85
HISPANIC. A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South
American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race. 6
Notable differences distinguish these definitions. According to the first
two, Hispanics must live in the United States; the third does not contain this
requirement. Does a person cease to be Hispanic simply by moving to Can-
ada? Would not a native American English speaker expect the word to apply
to a European as well as to an American?
The first two definitions also require that an Hispanic be Spanish-
speaking. Again, this distinguishes them from the third definition, which
may allow for Brazilians, who do not speak Spanish, to qualify as Hispanic
depending upon how one relates "other Spanish culture" to "South Ameri-
can." The first two definitions unquestionably exclude Portuguese speakers,
although it would be difficult to think of instances when we would want to
invoke the category of "Hispanic" without wishing also to include Brazilians
(especially since many people do not even realize that Brazilians do not
speak Spanish).87 These variations demonstrate that the idea behind "His-
panic" has been difficult to articulate. Consequently, many people doubt the
usefulness of the "Hispanic" category at all.88
Our primary interest, however, relates to the different structures of each
of these definitions. The first standard identifies a modal attribute of the
category (Spanish speaking) and elevates that trait to the definitional. The
second definition also identifies modal attributes (language and surname),
which it then uses to generate a nonexhaustive list of predominant exem-
plars. Finally, the third definition dispenses with the generic qualities of the
category, and simply lists the category members without trying to explain
why these classes are included. According to Lieber's argument, the more
the definition depends upon a list to do its work, the less satisfactory the
84. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 639 (3' College ed.
1988).
85. FRANK COTA-ROBLES NEWTON ET AL., HISPANIC MENTAL HEALTn RESIARCII: A
REFERENCEGUIDE 1 (1982).
86. 18 C.F.R. § 1302.4(a)(2) (2000).
87. But cf. Jefferson M. Fish, What Anthropology Can Do For Psychology, 102
AMERICAN ANThtROPOLOGIST 552, 559 (2000) (commenting that it is a mistake to classify
Brazilians as Hispanics).
88. Lisette E. Simon, Hispanics: Not a Cognizable Ethnic Group, 63 UNIV. CIN. L. REv.
497 (1994).
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definition becomes, suggesting that the three definitions become increas-
ingly flawed.
An initial appraisal, however, might conclude the opposite. The com-
parison between the three definitions seems to intimate that the third is the
best of the lot. But this outcome is misleading due to the incidentals of the
example. The possible universe of all Hispanics is finite, and, hence listable
in principle. Hispanics can include all the members of Central and South
American heritage, and Spanish-descendants in the Caribbean, and possibly
all European populations of the Iberian Peninsula and their colonies. If the
potential for unique members of the group were significantly larger, it is ap-
parent that the list strategy collapses under its own weight. An exhaustive
list becomes incomprehensible and unwieldy. The limits become clear when
applying the same approach to define "vegetable," a category with many
more types than "Hispanic."
In principle, the best strategy is that used by the first definition: to de-
cline to identify anything other than the "usual" category member. Any at-
tribute specified is understood to be sufficient but not necessary. The defini-
tion correctly reflects how the term is ordinarily used without falsely
conveying more precision than the term actually has for that community of
users. In contrast, each of the subsequent definitions reduces clarity for the
sake of precision. The second definition speaks not in terms of the "usual,"
but in terms of "all people." Because the list here is subordinate to the gen-
erating principle, exclusions from the list are not necessarily confounding.
That is not the case with the third definition. Neither the second nor the third
definition includes Spanish speakers from Caribbean nations, such as the
Dominican Republic. This oversight is only problematic in the third defini-
tion because only this list is intended to be a definitive and exhaustive list of
all Hispanics, as opposed to the illustrative nature of the second list. We do
not know why Caribbean Spanish speakers are excluded from the third defi-
nition's category of Hispanics; the list only tells us that they are so excluded.
Is this exclusion the unexpected outcome of a sound principle, or merely the
unfortunate oversight of a bad list? We cannot tell. Cynics will notice that
governmental regulation, where rationality is critical, utilize the flawed
strategy of the third definition.
It appears that Lieber was right. The only contexts where lists might be
a workable strategy are limited to those cases where the entire universe of
category members can be conveniently named or readily identified." When
89. Another possible context would involve scenarios where the items on the list arc not
natural instances of a kind. That is to say, there is no generalizable relationship linking the
members other than their shared presence on that particular list. Otherwise a list would be re-
quired only if it can be taken as inescapable that persons will fail to interpret the law with
"common sense and good faith."
The popularity of the list, in this light, might be taken as an indicator of the soured rela-
tions between the law and its citizenry. Philip Howard documents this strain in T[E DEATnt OF
COMMON SENSE 29 (1994). The "death of common sense" (and, we might add. the lack of
Lieber's other specified element, "good faith") have resulted, according to Howard, in the bal-
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the rationale for why these items belong together requires an explanation (as
it usually does), the list reduces to a supportive illustration of this more gen-
eral principle. Otherwise an irrational tension develops between a principle
of broad scope and a purportedly exhaustive list of all its embodiments that
is actually much narrower. Finally, because a list of examples may inadver-
tently import irrelevant variables into the equation and thereby even contra-
dict the principle it is intended to illustrate,' the principle alone would con-
sistently be the superior approach than any "principle plus list" strategy.
Better, Lieber might say, for lists and the like not to exist in the first
place because where they are not redundant they are self-defeating. This pol-
icy has the additional virtue of not penalizing groups who, on principle,
should be included but who fail to appear on the appended list. The "true
sense" of a law can be safely couched in brief but clear terms which are best
looning of regulations and process requirements to ludicrous extremes.
Although the problem Howard identifies is real enough, he discusses only one side (the
government's) of a dialectical relationship between government and the public. People no
longer view the law as a guide to do the "right" thing, but as an obstacle to be gotten around
in quest of personal advantage. The public, it can be said, has become a society of "end-
runners." An example here would be Vice-President's Gore pointing to "the lack of control-
ling legal authority" to explain why he did nothing wrong in using his office to make tele-
phone solicitation calls. If it is not explicitly forbidden, then it is permitted.
In response to such attitudes, legislators must work overtime to corral the public back into
legal observance, and hence the excruciatingly precise descriptions and details in laws and
regulations. Feeding into this process is the person's eagerness to sue both other persons and
the government should any item under their control adversely impact him or her. To preclude
such suits, governments must enforce stricter controls.
Consequently, both governmental and personal attitudes will have to be changed if the
problem of over-regulation is to be improved. Once the public again begins to display "com-
mon sense and good faith," government can assume as much when they write laws and regu-
lations.
90. For an example of an illustrative list contradicting its generating principle, see Em-
ployment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). Until that time it was assumed that the U.S. Constitution contained protections for the
free exercise of religion. This decision held otherwise when it ruled that religious actions arc
not protected from otherwise neutral and generally applicable laws. Justice Scalia reasoned
that the list of cases purportedly supporting the protection of religious actions from legislative
acts "involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunc-
tion with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press ... or
the right of parents... to direct the education of their children." Id. at 881. In other words,
these were all "hybrid situations." Consequently any claim to Free Exercise Clause as a shield
against generally applicable laws (i.e., laws which do not target religious acts specifically)
which are not also claims based on other constitutional protections, must be denied. The Free
Exercise Clause alone affords no protection, and because the other claims are already pro-
tected, it adds nothing to the defendant's argument. Smith will one day join another list, that
of embarrassing Supreme Court decisions, headed by Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson, and
most of the decisions designed to dismantle the Mormon church.
More to the immediate point, the result of Smith is certainly a conclusion based upon the
accidental attributes of the members of the list of Free Exercise cases, rather than upon their
primary attributes. The exceptions have not merely swallowed the rule, but thoroughly di-
gested and excreted it as well.
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interpreted by "common sense and good faith" and construed to adequately
reconcile new fact situations with the established intent.'
Sophisticated language users realize this historicity and contextuality of
language and often frame their injunctions to the future broadly, inviting
future interpreters to use their good sense. The impulse to control future
interpreters through elaborate and precise instructions bespeaks dictatorial
egoism and foolish naivet6. Over time these superfluous instructions will
become contradictory; they will hobble well-meaning interpreters with ar-
bitrary absurdities, or license unforeseen mischief.92
This system would be vastly more flexible than one which requires list-
keeping, and its responsiveness to new contexts cannot help but work to eve-
ryone's long-term advantage.
Objections to this approach would certainly invoke the fear of chaos.
Without explicit limits or guidelines, "anything goes," and the very founda-
tions of our political system would crumble. The few words here will do lit-
tle to assuage this paranoia, but they should suffice at least to extricate Lie-
ber from any such charges. Central to the prevention of anarchy in the
absence of painfully exacting detailings would be Lieber's reliance upon
"good faith," defined as a conscientious "desire to arrive at truth... it means
that we take the words fairly as they were meant."' Good faith interpretation
will not always, of course, work in one's favor, and an unfavorable interpre-
tation would certainly increase one's burden at the next step of construction;
there are even situations when it is appropriate to disregard interpretation
altogether.' But the integrity of the system overall requires that the first step
91. In several places Lieber underscores the organicity of the law: "A code is not a her-
barium, in which we deposit law like dried plants. Let a code be the fruit grown out of the
civil life of a nation, and contain the seed for future growth." LEBER, supra note 61, at 1915.
"[R]elations change with the progress of time, so that, after a long lapse of time, we must
give up either the letter of the law, or its intent, since both, owing to a change in circum-
stances, do not any longer agree." Id. at 1969.
92. Guyora Binder, Institutions and Linguistic Conventions: 77te Pragmatismi of Lieber's
Legal Hermeneutics, 16 CARDOZO L.R. 2169, 2186 (1995).
93. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 1947.
Faithful interpretation implies that words, or assemblages of words, be taken in
that sense, which we honestly believe that their utterer attached to them. We have
to take words, then, in their most probable sense, not in their original, etymologi-
cal, or classical, if the text be such that we cannot fairly suppose that the author
used the words with skill, knowledge, and accurate care and selection.
Id. at 1952.
94. We have seen that interpretation means nothing more than
finding out the true sense and meaning. But it is not said that interpretation is all
that shall guide us, and although I believe the remarks in the preceding section to
be correct, still there are considerations which ought to induce us to abandon inter-
pretation, or in other words to sacrifice the direct meaning of a text to considera-
tions still weightier; especially not to slaughter justice, the sovereign object of
laws, for the law itself, the means of obtain it.
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be an accurate interpretation of the statute." Where one moves from there is
a separate question. While construction affords much "wiggle room" to
achieve a desired end,96 it has limits, beyond which lies what Lieber terms
"extravagant construction."97 If properly respected, these structural safe-
guards suffice to prevent the descent into utter barbarism that some imagine
a reliance on the readers' good faith might entail.
From the perspective of Lieber's hermeneutics, incrementalism offers
dubious rewards, even if successful. Its attempt can be expected to result in
either reduced clarity or increased imprecision, exactly the opposite effects
intended. Even the mere indulgence in the strategy encourages a legal sys-
tem in which "sinister interpretations" proliferate, moving the rights advo-
cates even further from their goal of universal protections. The default as-
sumption about incrementalist legislative approaches should be that they are
inferior at best, and self-defeating at worst. The burden falls to the incremen-
talist to demonstrate that these weaknesses would not apply in a specific ap-
plication, especially when the avowed aim of the extension of the list is to
bring clarity to a broader principle.
IV. LIST INCREMENTALISM IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE: THE PRACTICAL
ANALYSIS
Some readers may be unconvinced by the hermeneutic analysis in the
preceding section. Considerations of how language works, and how lan-
guage interacts with psychology, may be insufficient to refute the prima fa-
cie attractiveness of list incrementalism. But the limitations of incremental-
ism do not end there. The strategy to get gays explicitly on the list is not
merely self-defeating, but also counterproductive. By this I mean that over
and above any logical inconsistencies that might arise from pursuit of the
policy, it does not even do a very good job of accomplishing its short-term
objectives.
Id. at 1962.
95. Lieber's identification of framer's intent as thefirst step in legal construction should
be contrasted with other contemporary legal theorists who argue that this is the last step, that
is, the framers' intent is binding, without change or expansion.
96. Most promising here is "transcendent construction," whereby the construction of a
statute is "founded upon a principle superior to the text" at issue. LIEBER, supra note 61, at
1937. Again taking the case of same-sex marriage, a transcendent construction could perhaps
take this form: While the legislators believed that the list in the first scenario was an accurate
reflection of the principles behind civil marriage, the case of same-sex marriage shows this
not to be so, and thus the principles of marriage will override the legislative specifications for
it. The construction overrides the legislators' intent about the list, but not their understanding
of the higher marriage principles. Because the result is still based upon the wider intents of
the lawmakers, the outcome is not "extravagant." Actual legal strategies defending same-sex
marriage utilize transcendent construction when they argue that restricted marriage criteria
should be overturned due to their conflict with higher constitutional principles such as equal
protection guarantees, or non-discrimination clauses.
97. Id. at 1939.
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The rationale behind the adoption of this strategy is that if civil liberties
cannot be extended to all simultaneously, we will at least make sure that they
are given to us now. This immediate parochialism, even if shamefully self-
centered, is not politically irrational if at worst it delays, but does not deny,
other groups the same privileges. But the inclusion of a new group on the list
detrimentally impacts those left behind beyond mere inability to enjoy the
new protections." Eric Heinze offers a good example. He argues that the
failure to include sexual orientation within the United Nations human rights
agenda results not merely in the exclusion of sexual orientation, but a further
mystification of it, which in turn is used to justify its continued exclusion."
He describes more generally this problem of "inclusion-as-exclusion":
One might maintain that "a rising tide raises all ships": the progressive
recognition of ever more specialized interests must surely promote an
overall climate of tolerance and broad-mindedness that will benefit sexual
minorities in the long run.
Yet the trend toward special instruments is a double-edged sword. It in-
deed represents progress, for those who get one. At the same time...it
raises the stakes for those who have no realistic hope of getting one ....
Each new instrument has the-perhaps inadvertent, but nevertheless per-
nicious-effect of underscoring the fact that sexual minorities still do not
have one. The longer sexual minorities fail to get one, the greater the sus-
picion that there must be some good reason. In short, the increasing inclu-
sion of certain issues itself serves to highlight the continued exclusion of
sexual minorities.
Because of the existence of international conventions which do not in-
clude the transgendered, Heinze specifically identifies the transgendered as
worse off than they would otherwise be if those conventions did not exist at
all.'0'
Therefore, as the list becomes ever more extensive, the pressure in-
creases to justify why your group is not on it, encouraging a more frantic
rush to be included." Hate crimes laws, one author has suggested, "fuel a
98. That this concern is real enough can be illustrated by the fact that the ninth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution explicitly seeks to deny any negative connotation for rights not
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
fights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. Co. sr.
amend. IX.
99. Eric Heinze, Sexual Orientation ard International Law: A Study in the Manufacture
of Cross-Cultural "Sensitivity," 22 MicU. J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (2001).
100. Id. at 296-97.
101. Id. at 298.
102- See Sharon Carton, Book Review: Punishing Hate, 92(3) Law LIBRARY J. 353, 357
(2000) (quoting Frederick M. Lawrence):
[Tihe state makes a normative statement about the treatment of gays and lesbians
when it frames its bias crime law: Failure to include sexual orientation implies that
gays and lesbians are not as deserving of protection as racial, religious, or ethnic
minorities, and that sexual orientation is not as serious a social fissure line as race,
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wretched and divisive competition for victim-group status."' 3 If the list of
groups against whom it is illegal to discriminate is long, the inference can be
drawn that discrimination against unlisted groups is thereby acceptable."0 '
A pragmatic outlook concludes that on the whole incrementalism exac-
erbates the problem it is intended to solve. Even if it solves the problem for
one group, that very success will create either new or greater problems for
other groups not already on the list. These problems are in addition to their
lack of participation in the benefits of that list, a decidedly negative result if
one espouses the goal of incrementalism in the name of advancing the rights
of all. Incrementalism is at best sometimes a private good, but it is always a
public ill. The question becomes to what extent one is willing to harm the
larger society in pursuit of short-term personal benefits.
A. ENDA as Incremental Progress toward Employment Non-Discrimination
The courts have upheld the ability of legislatures, "for reasons of prag-
matism or administrative convenience ... to address problems incremen-
tally."'0 5 A prominent arena for legislative incrementalism concerns protec-
tions against employment discrimination. Our society has demonstrated a
commitment to the belief that irrelevant personal traits should not bar one
from participation in the workplace. Even groups convinced that homosexu-
ality is unacceptable and that it should be criminalized nonetheless believe
that gays should be protected from job discrimination."'° Groups historically
religion, and ethnicity.
103. Stuart Taylor Jr., Let's Make the Federal Hate Crimes Law Broader-Much
Broader, 32 NAT'L J. 2851, 2852 (Sept. 16, 2000).
104. This is the canon of construction called expressio unius, exclusio alterius (expres-
sion of one thing excludes another). "Expressio unius is applied to mean that if a statute ex-
pressly mentions what is intended to be within its coverage, then the statute excludes that
which is not mentioned." HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW,
FOURTH EDITION 69-70 (1999). The Tenth Amendment, for example, brings the U.S. Constitu-
tion within the scope of this canon: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
105. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 883 (Vt. 1999). In this case Justice Johnson (con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) cites Canadian authorities to the effect that legislative
incrementalism should not be an option in the realm of civil rights: "'[Glroups that have his-
torically been the target of discrimination cannot be expected to wait patiently for the protcc-
tion of their human dignity and equal rights while governments move toward reform one step
at a time."' Id. at 904.
106. In the 1998 National Survey of Americans on Values, 53% of all respondents be-
lieved that gay sex is "unacceptable," 34% that "public" homosexuality should be illegal, but
87% that job discrimination against gays was wrong. By contrast, these same figures for Tra-
ditional White Protestant Evangelicals are 74%, 64%, and 74%. John C. Green, Religion and
Politics in the 1990s: Confrontations and Coalitions, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN PoI.rrlcs:
THE 2000 ELECTION IN CONTEXT 19, 29 (2000). See also Alan Yang, FROM WRONGS TO
RIGHTS, 1973 TO 1999 (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute, 1999): "While
the trends in legal equality have been toward acceptance and majority support, cultural and
moral attitudes toward homosexual behavior have historically shown less change." Id. at 24.
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subjected to such bars have been the target of special legislation intended ei-
ther to criminalize discrimination on those grounds, or to mandate positive
actions that would redress prior exclusions. Not all personal traits receive
this special legislative attention, but only those that are primarily irrelevant
to job performance (such as ethnicity and religious affiliation) and that have
historically been the target of systemic discrimination.
Spokespersons for gay men and lesbians argue that sexual orientation is
an irrelevant consideration for employment decisions,'" that its discovery
nonetheless can negatively impact a person's career path,'" and that the best
solution to this problem is legislative. Despite the popular support for such
employment protections, and their conformity to established equity princi-
ples, no protection at the federal level exists against employment discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation." Legal protections against private em-
ployment discrimination based on sexual orientation have been recognized
in only eighteen states and the District of Columbia, as well as over one
hundred cities and eighteen counties. " ' The Employment Non-
Discrimination Act [ENDA], in both state and federal versions, is the push to
have "sexual orientation" added to lists which provide these protections
wherever they exist in federal, state, and local laws.
The mere act of trying to get on a list, any list, raises the issue of incre-
mentalism. In this instance, the problem centers on the question of whether
gay men and lesbians can enjoy a safe and fair environment if all persons are
not similarly protected, or, failing all persons, that at least we and our closest
allies are protected. Can we advance our own social welfare while leaving
behind other sexual minorities (e.g., transgenders) or ignoring the battles of
the similarly underrepresented such as women, the poor, and the culturally
marginalized? If so, we are entitled to restrict our energies to problems
which narrowly focus on our own well-being; if not, our movement would
necessarily have to position itself on a plethora of divergent issues in the
name of enlightened self-interest."' The polar evils here are those of paro-
One indication of the general acceptance of employment protections for gays occurs in the
1997 Congressional hearing on ENDA. Although in 1994 several persons were willing to tes-
tify against ENDA, the Senate Committee could identify no one willing to publicly argue
against ENDA's enactment. Sen. Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1997: Hearings on Sen. 869, 105th Cong. 2 (Oct. 23, 1997).
107. Antigay activists, of course, argue the opposite, that job performance is not the only
consideration in employment decisions, and that sexual orientation is not irrelevant. See Sen.
Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994: Hear-
ings on Sen. 2238, 103rd Cong. 29 (July 29, 1994) (testimony of Joseph E. Broadus).
108. See, e.g., Pedeira v. Ky. Baptist Home for Children, Inc., No. 3:OOCV-2 10-S, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10283 (W.D. Ky. July 23, 2001) (plaintiff fired because her lesbianism be-
came public knowledge).
109. Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling, 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
110. WAYNEVANDER MEIDE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY 4 (2000).
111. Two letters in an issue of the Southern Voice illustrate the broad sweep of issues
this reasoning can force the gays' rights movement to embrace. The first letter argues that
abortion is necessarily a gay issue. The second maintains that because "no one is free while
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chialism or of dissipation, of becoming guilty of the same myopia that has
caused general society to ignore our problems or of spreading our efforts too
thinly to be effective.
At every crossroads requiring a choice, parochialism has carried the
day. Where goals can be parsed, they will be, and usually to the detriment of
even more marginal groups than ourselves. As implemented in practice, in-
crementalism is an invidious strategy.
This problem made manifest concerns whether ENDA should be written
so as to encompass gender identity as well as sexual orientation. Adequate
reasons exist to adopt this language. First, the explicit goals of ENDA cannot
be achieved without addressing gender identity issues as well. Consider an
ENDA law that protects against employment discrimination based upon sex-
ual orientation alone. Such a law would not protect against discrimination
stemming from gender role infractions. Bluntly put, I may not be able to fire
a man because he sleeps with men, but perhaps I can fire him if he is a "bot-
tom" when he does it. Every man who has ever been accused of being a
"sissy," and every woman taunted for being a "tomboy" is guilty of such in-
fractions of the gender code. "Passive" homosexuals and effeminate men of
any orientation, homo or hetero, transgress the stereotypical gender bounda-
ries demanded of "real" men, and could be discriminated against on that ba-
sis without violating ENDA.
Transgenders may be at the extreme end of the gender role transgres-
sors, but their issue is also a gay issue. By one report, "of 80 [gay men and
lesbian] respondents, 61% had experienced employment discrimination, with
76% of that group citing gender expression [and not sexual orientation] as a
basis.""' "What this means is that employers would continue to discriminate
against at least 76% of the GLB [gay, lesbian, bisexual] population even un-
der ENDA.""' 3 ENDA without gender identity protections offers no protec-
tions against this prejudice. Recall Cheryl Summerville, the woman fired
from Cracker Barrel because she was lesbian. She had this to say about her
experience: "They said they didn't really want to fire me because the policy
was really aimed at effeminate men and women who have masculine traits
who might be working as waiters or waitresses.""' In other words, although
the Cracker Barrel incident may be considered the case par excellence high-
lighting the need for ENDA, at best it can be said that the law might have
others are still being oppressed," and because "we have been based and discriminated against"
ourselves, we should be especially reluctant to do the same to someone else. These noble
principles, the writer holds, commits the movement to the cause of animal rights. Letters,
13(43) SOUTHERN VOICE 19 (Dec. 7, 2000).
112. Sarah D. Fox, Gender Expression as a Basis for Employment Discrimination in
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Populations, available at
http://www.iwaynet.net/-sarahfox/employ.htm.
113. Angie Bolin, Three Quarters of Gays and Lesbians Dumped by ENDA, Gender Ad-
vocacy Internet News, Sept. 1, 1999 (quoting Sarah Fox).
114. Ronald Smothers, Restaurant Rescinds Ban on Hiring Gays, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Mar. 4, 1991, at B6.
[Vol. 38
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss1/2
BABY STEPS OR ONE FELL SWOOP?
protected Summerville but not have discouraged Cracker Barrel from pursu-
ing its true goal of purging its ranks of gender nonconformists. Enacted
without gender identity language, ENDA would achieve no real protections
for gay men and lesbians, but would allow politicians to claim they had done
their bit for the gay community, discouraging their receptivity to taking more
substantive action on its behalf.
Also favoring inclusion of gender identity within ENDA is the historical
reality that transgenders have been the natural allies of gay men and lesbians
at least since the beginnings of the modem gays' rights movement. While it
is commonly recognized that this movement commenced with the Stonewall
Riots in 1969, it is less widely realized that this action was spearheaded by
"the drag queens [who had come] to the end of their patience with the police
raids on Greenwich Village gay bars.""' The movement we claim as our own
was in many ways created and gifted to us by the transgenders.
Unfortunately, many have rewritten events. Transgenders are often ac-
cused of trying to "hijack" "our" movement. In an Advocate poll asking
"Should transgendered people be a part of the gay rights movement," 48%
said No."6 The inclusion of transgenders in ENDA, then, could be expected
to meet resistance for no other reasons than that many gays are not comfort-
able with them and do not consider them part of our community.
This early convergence between the interests of homosexuals and of
transgenders is not to say that the two groups cannot reasonably differ on
important issues."7 Possibly ENDA is one of these. But while significant dif-
ferences will always distinguish these as two separate groups, on a more
general level they are both sexual minorities trying to live lives of dignity in
the midst of sometimes crushing condescension, rejection, and even abuse.
These broader shared concerns suggest that the coalition should be presumed
115. Lillian Faderman, The Big Bang, in LONG ROAD TO FR ..Dt 19 (1994). See also
SUSAN FALUDI, SIFFED 502 (1999).
116. Advocate Poll, N* 788 THE ADvoCATE 8 (June 22, 1999).
117. One issue on which homosexuals and transgenders are likely consistently to dis-
agree relates to the utility of psychological diagnosis. Homosexuals long fought to have ho-
mosexuality removed from the Diagnostic Manual. See RONALD BAYER, HOOsEXUAIrTY
AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLTmCS OF DIAGNOSIS (1981). There is no conceivable cir-
cumstance in which it is desirable to have "homosexuality" as a medical diagnosis warranting
treatment.
However, certification under a "gender identity disorder" has often been judged desirable
for transgenders. Such a diagnosis makes it easier to convince insurance agencies to pay for
expensive sex-change operations, and a threshold of proof of this kind relieves employers'
concerns about rampant and capricious "drag" in the work environment. For example, the
New Orleans Gender Identification Ordinance (18,794 M.C.S., June 18, 1998). passed with
significant input from transgender leaders, does not protect "cross-dressing" in the work envi-
ronment unless the employee or applicant provides the employer with the wntten statement of
a licensed doctor or other health care professional certifying that the employee or applicant
presents the characteristics of gender identification disorder or another similar status or condi-
tion.
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intact unless there are clear, articulable reasons that warrant fission on any
particular issue."8
The Human Rights Campaign [HRC] is our principle lobbyist for the
federal ENDA. The original version of ENDA included "protections based
both on sexual orientation and gender expression. HRC convinced [Mass.
Rep. Barney] Frank to remove gender-based language before the bill's intro-
duction and has worked very hard since then to ensure the language is not
amended back in."' 19
Frank's openness to HRC's request to exclude language covering trans-
genders was blatantly pragmatic: ENDA "would have 'no chance whatso-
ever' of passage if it included" such language.' Graham Segroves, speaking
on behalf of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, agreed that the fear
exists that "including protection for the transgender community will kill the
bill."'' This perception is certainly widespread, and actual experience in
other contexts suggests that it is not wholly unreasonable.'
118. Transgenders may also prove an important wedge on the issue of same-sex mar-
riage. While all states currently follow the "one man, one woman" marriage rule, they differ
on when the determination of sex is to be made. For some states, the criterion is sex at birth,
while for others it is sex at marriage. And no state to my knowledge routinely nullifies a mar-
riage in which one partner changes sex after marriage. So while a state will say that it is
staunchly against same-sex marriages, its neighbors might perceive its practices otherwise.
Once these practical results become more widely known, that in fact same-sex marriages are
not unheard of in our country, the argument that we should do overtly what is being done
covertly becomes more convincing.
119. Sarah Fox, Frankly Transphobic, QUILL OP/ED RELEASE, June 22, 1999.
120. Frank Angers Transgendered Community, WASHINGTON BLADE, July 2, 1999.
Frank goes further: "It's not as if this is a truck moving along at 60 miles-per-hour and they
are asking us for a ride. This is an uphill climb. We can win, but it irks me that fighting for
this bill has become less important than amending it." Loren King, Task Force Drops Support
for Federal Anti-Bias Bill, BAY W11-1OWS, June 10, 1999.
121. Jennifer Coleman, Transgendered Community Speaks Up, Associated Press, July
20, 2000. Ultimately the NGLTF withdrew its support for ENDA because of its failure to in-
clude gender identity issues:
Without the inclusion of transgendered people, NGLTF cannot endorse ENDA.
We do not oppose ENDA, but advocate adding language that is more inclusive.
WE intend to do no harm to ENDA or to the cause of [gay, lesbian, bisexual]
equality. But just as our African American colleagues in several states have re-
fused to more forward on hate crimes legislation that covers race but not sexual
orientation, we too feel obligated to more forward together.
NGLTF, NGLTF Supports Trans Inclusion in Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Press Rc-
lease (June 16, 1999).
122. In the 2001 session of the Louisiana legislature, Senate bill 862, a state version of
the federal ENDA bill, was introduced. The original text banned employment discrimination
based on "actual or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity." Mike Fleming, LA Sees
Employment Anti-Bias Bill, SOUTHERN VOICE (Apr. 12, 2001). The bill ultimately failed. Be-
fore it passed out of committee, however, SB 862 was amended to eliminate the gender iden-
tity language. LAGPAC, Press Release (May 11, 2001). This experience does suggest that for
legislatures gender identity is a topic even more controversial than sexual orientation, as the
strategists behind the federal ENDA have argued.
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This excision has been particularly unproblematic for HRC because its
mission statement has, until very recently, restricted its concerns to "lesbian
and gay people," communicating the organization's self-perception that it
owes no formal allegiance to transgenders.'" This exclusion contrasts with
the inclusiveness of the other large national gays' rights organization, the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, which amended its mission statement
in 1997 "to include the struggle for equal rights for transgendered peo-
ple.... We believe that there is one movement for gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgender equality."'24
In response to these criticisms, HRC promised support to amend ENDA
to include protections for the transgendered, after it is first passed without
them." This strategy is not unprecedented. A New Orleans local hate crimes
ordinance'" did not originally include gender identity. After its passage,
there was the expressed hope that the term "sexual orientation," which was
in the ordinance, would embrace transgenders as well.' :1 When a formal
opinion advised otherwise, a campaign was undertaken to insert this specific
language. The 1997 Hate Crimes Ordinance was thereafter amended, with
123. HRC, Working for Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights, Oct. 8, 2000. The mission state-
ment was amended in March of 2001 to include "gender expression and identity." Elizabeth
Birch, Speaking about Gender Expression and Identity, HRC Press Release (Mar. 23, 2001).
Despite this cosmetic change forced by grassroots pressures described below, Birch goes on
to say that the new language "will not change substantially in form or substance" the ENDA
bill. Id "[lit is our assessment that many congressional members are invested in the bill in its
current form and that any changes would not be well-received on Capitol Hill." Id. For these
reasons, the March change to the mission statement alters nothing in the analysis by this Arti-
cle.
124. NGLTF, NGLTF Supports Transgender Inclusion in Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, Press Release, June 16, 1999. BiNet USA, "the largest national bisexual
organization," and GenderPAC also withdrew their support for ENDA for this reason. See
BiNet, BiNet USA Rescinds Support of ENDA in Current Form, Press Release. July 25, 1999;
GenderPAC, Position Paper: Including Gender Protection in ENDA, Aug. 6, 1999.
Again, noting the recent language change to the HRC mission statement, a contrast can be
made between the action supporting the transgender-inclusive language from these other or-
ganizations, and the explicit disavowal by HRC that its new language will impact any of its
ongoing projects.
125. Laura Brown, Dems Say No Chance on ENDA, Hate Crimes Till 2001, SounTE.N
VOICE, June 3, 1999. This strategy has been criticized as placing transgender people in "a
holding zone outside of the mainstream lesbian and gay political movement." Courtney Sharp.
Gender Protections Benefit All, PFLAG POLE, Spring 2001. at 5.
126. New Orleans City Ordinance 18,303 M.C.S., June 5, 1997, to ordain Section 54-380
of the City Code.
127. The hope is that transgenders can be protected under already existing laws,
eliminating the necessity of a new and protracted political battle to amend the laws with new.
inclusive language. For example, a decision by the Connecticut Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities ruled that "state laws prohibiting sex discrimination include trans-
gender people within those protections." Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Connecticut
Human Rights Commission Rules in Favor of Transgender People, Press Release (Nov. 15,
2000). For a discussion outlining the difficulties confronting any expectation that transgenders
can be protected by existing non-discrimination language. see Paisley Currah & Shannon
Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality
for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WoMh.N & L. 37 (2000).
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surprisingly little opposition, by Ordinance 18,794 M.C.S., June 18, 1998, to
extend its protections to this category.
Where the NGLTF sees a single movement, HRC sees many, 2' but
HRC has promised to be cooperative and generous. Some doubt that HRC
would itself undertake a project to subsequently amend the statute, instead
leaving that job to unnamed others. 29 Its assurances of aid are widely con-
sidered to be disingenuous. No other gay and lesbian organization possesses
the clout or budget of the HRC. Any relevant federal bill that the HRC does
not aggressively endorse is unlikely to pass. Few people within the commu-
nity have expressed confidence that HRC would actually commit significant
resources to amend ENDA after its primary constituency had been safely
protected. 3' This failure of HRC to live up to its self-denominated claim of
striving for "human rights" instead of merely "gay and lesbian" rights has
generated sporadic protests.
In 1995, seven New Orleans recipients of an HRC award "For Out-
standing Leadership and Dedicated Community Service" publicly expressed
being "appalled at the [HRC] decision to cut loose a significant portion of
our community for perceived political expedience.""'3 On the same day, the
local chapter of P-FLAG (Parents and Friend of Lesbians and Gays) notified
Elizabeth Birch, Executive Director of HRC, that its Board of Directors had
"voted unanimously to advise [her] that it felt that the [HRC] should reverse
its policy in this regard.... For an organization operating under the name
"Human Rights Campaign Fund" to seek such an exclusion is in our opinion
sheer hypocrisy that no amount of political expediency can excuse.""' In re-
ply, Michael Roybal, Chief Legislative Counsel for HRC, intimated that the
decision to exclude transgenders was made by a civil rights coalition "of
some 185 organizations," and denied that HRC possessed the ability to make
unilateral decisions about the substantive content of ENDA."' He did not
128. Some have questioned that there exists even the identifiable constituency HRC does
recognize. "I no longer believe in a collective queerness," writes William Mann.
The great queer collective consciousness was a myth our gay parents taught us,
like our blood parents taught us about Santa Claus. We needed to believe it once,
and we can treasure its memory and what it gave us forever, but there comes a
time when we have to let the myth go.
William J. Mann, Shredding the Rainbow: Separate and Equal: Letting Go of the Idea that
Gay is Enough to Keep Us Together, 18(2) FRONTIERS NEWSMAGAZINE, May 14, 1999. Once
one has, like HRC, decided to draw the lines of exclusion, there is perhaps no principled rea-
son to stop drawing them at all.
129. For an easily accessible, if cursory, overview of the troubled relationship between
HRC and the transgender community, see Mubarak Dahir, Whose Movement Is It?, 786 T1iii
ADVOCATE 50 (May 25, 1999).
130. "[T]ransactivists simply have no faith in this portion of HRC's policy." Gender-
PAC, Position Paper: Including Gender Protection in ENDA, Aug. 6, 1999.
131. Stewart P. Butler et al., Statement of Louisiana Human Rights Campaign Fund
Committee Honorees, Sept. 14, 1995.
132. Sandra Pailet, Letter to Elizabeth Birch, Sept. 14, 1995.
133. Michael R. Roybal, Letter to Sandra Pailet, Jan. 11, 1996.
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suggest that this coalition action was made over the objection of HRC, but
repeated the mantra of HRC's intention "to assist transgender representatives
with an amendment strategy in the context of ENDA.""
After two years and little action by HRC, three signers of the first letter
from the local HRC award recipients, plus one new one, again expressed
their skepticism that HRC was seriously addressing their concerns, and their
conviction that HRC was "not likely to fully include transgenders in [its]
agenda in the foreseeable future unless [its] failure to do so were to result in
a large scale withdrawal of financial support."'35 Consequently these com-
munity leaders immediately withdrew their personal financial support of
HRC, and promised a boycott of the next year's HRC Louisiana fundraising
dinner unless "substantial progress" was made." Several members of the lo-
cal executive committee responsible for the dinner-by far HRC's largest
fundraiser in the state-resigned in protest.'37 This and similar letters re-
ceived no formal reply.'
The boycott went on as planned. There is no indication that it signifi-
cantly impacted the amount of funds raised. Either the long list of persons
committed to the boycott was not likely to have attended the expensive
($125 per person) dinner in the first place, or the threat of a boycott ener-
gized HRC to recruit replacement participants. While at the time there were
indications that the boycott might spread to other states, the intense activism
on this issue has since dissipated. The boycott effort has not been repeated,
and persons who were "appalled" at the transgender-exclusion of ENDA in
1998 are very comfortable advocating for its passage in 2000, even though
the text had not changed.'39
134. Id.
135. B. Skip Ward et al., Letter to Elizabeth Birch, May 17, 1997.
136. Id.
137. [Letters from Toni Pizanie and Rick Cosgriff], A.inusu MAG. Jan. 23. 1998. at 33.
138. B. Skip Ward et al., Letter [to the comnmunity at large], Mar. 23, 1998.
139. See Laura Brown, Atlanta to Ban Transgender Discrimination. SoUTHERN: Voice.
Jan. 20, 2000 ("Despite fierce outcry from transgender organizations, those fighting for
ENDA-including the Human Rights Campaign, the Washington-based gay rights lobby-
have argued that adding 'gender identity' to the bill would make it too controversial, hamper-
ing efforts to pass protections for gay men and lesbians.").
In other words, in the last five years absolutely nothing has changed relative to HRC's
recalcitrant refusal to extend ENDA protections to transgenders, or even to beieve that as an
organization it owes any regard for their concerns.
On July 31, 2001, ENDA was introduced for the fifth time into Congress. Early indicators
show that little has changed on either side of the debate. Co-sponsors like Joseph Lieberman
again touts the bill as "extend[ing] the bedrock American values of fairness and equality to a
group of our fellow citizens," and of "progress" in rights. 147 CONG. REc. S8480 (daily ed.
July 31, 2001). On the right, ENDA is claimed to "give homosexual pressure groups enor-
mous power in the workplace" that "threatens the rights of conscience." Culture and Family
Institute, ENDA is Back, with a Kiss, THE CULTURE AND FAMILY RtPORT. Aug. !. 2001. On
the left, transgender activists split between directing their ire at the organizations such as
HRC which push for the gender-identity exclusive ENDA. and those who go so far as to ac-
tively work against the passage of ENDA itself so long as it "'drop[s] in the grease" trans-
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The piecemeal implementation of employment non-discrimination legis-
lation has proven to be problematic, to say the least. Yale law professor
Kenji Yoshino has suggested that "[t]he idea that civil rights... 'trickle
down"' from one group to another "is bad for both groups."'" Certainly the
example before us supports his conclusion. In the rush to get ourselves onto
the lifeboats of legal protection we have proven our willingness to disgrace
ourselves by pushing our closest allies out of the way, possibly becoming so
engrossed in petty squabbles that we all go down with the ship. The attempt
exposes a greater commitment to political expediency than to principled ad-
vocacy when the language of unity and equality is used to effect greater di-
vides and marginalizations. But even assuming the best of intentions and the
most sensitive of executions, as a practical matter have we any reason to ex-
pect that this incrementalist strategy would yield the claimed desired results
of a prejudice-free workplace?
B. The Pragmatic Outlook Generally
The argument could be offered that the failure of ENDA proponents to
successfully employ an incrementalist strategy should not be generalized to
other cases; the strategy itself is sound even if unsuccessful in any particular
instance. But is this a valid position? Is the counterproductivity of incremen-
talism limited to the incompetent execution of the strategy rather than to its
inherent properties? Probably not.
Nathan Glazer, considering the issue of economic equality and the mul-
titudinous programs designed to effect that result, makes the following ob-
servation:
[Because] of these conflicting and competing values it is literally not pos-
sible for government, at any rate democratic government, to move to more
equality in income as a general and overriding goal. It must move toward
more equality in more piecemeal and concrete ways-for the aged, the
sick, the handicapped, women, the young, students, the low-income farm-
ers, the unemployed, and on and on. It turns out, not for any reason that I
can find written in the heavens, that the battle for more different kinds of
equality, whatever satisfaction it may give one group or another, does not
lead, or has not lead, to any overall movement toward equality.' 41
Consider what he is saying: We are precluded from enforcing economic
equality at a stroke due to our democratic system, so we tinker with different
bits of the population hoping to effect that same outcome. But the end result
gender persons. See sample letter to Senators posted distributed by transgenderlegal.com.
Events subsequent to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
have removed ENDA, along with most non-terrorist and non-appropriation legislation, from
likely consideration in the current Congress.
140. Kristin Eliasberg, Making a Case for the Right to be Different, N.Y. TIMm. June 16.
2001, at B 11.
141. NATHAN GLAZER, TtE LIMITs OF SOCIAL POLICY 18 (1988).
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of all that piecemeal tinkering has not been to bring us any closer to the real
goal of an across-the-board improvement. Glazer explains that this is not
because the individual programs have been ineffective. On the contrary, they
may be taken to be doing the jobs for which they were designed. He finds
instead "that the social programs have had a dynamic impact, which creates
new classes of poor that take up the bottom position as those assisted by so-
cial programs rise out of poverty."'"2 The piecemeal approach to economic
equality has not changed the overall distribution of income, but only altered
the characteristics of those at the bottom of the ladder. The list of those
groups economically benefited grows even as new groups are added to the
ranks of the poor. Like a bump in a rug, to correct the problem in one spot
only causes it to arise in another. If the goal was to get rid of the bump in
that particular spot, the strategy has been effective. But if the intent was to
correct the overall bumpiness of the rug, it has been and will continue to be a
failure. The bumpiness must be rectified wholesale, by re-laying the rug, or
not at all. Incrementalism will not render the same result.
What Glazer gives us, then, is one example where a broad goal dis-
sected into separate bits leads not to ever closer approximations to the goal,
but instead to an altered demographic profile with no change in the overall
picture. 3 Have we any reason to think that a broad goal in other contexts
similarly sectioned will yield better results? Will doling out employment
protections in increments bring us closer to the final goal of protection for all
(as HRC presumes when it says that it will fight for sexual orientation now,
gender identity later), or will new protections for one group merely shift the
discriminatory practices onto a new targeted group, and perhaps heightened
discrimination against those left behind?
This question cannot be answered with certainty beforehand in any spe-
cific case. But Glazer's analysis forces upon us the conclusion that the best
evidence favors the latter outcome. That would seem to make sense, given
the history of our own movement. The struggle to secure gays' rights was in
part inspired by the earlier actions of blacks and women. As one group
achieves some level of sociolegal security, another traditionally steps in to
take the vacated bottom rung. There seems to be as much discrimination and
142. Id. at 163. For example,
Social security permits more old people to live alone rather than with their chil-
dren. Thus [it] encourages independence while also reducing the incomes of the
households it makes it possible to maintain. A program giving assistance to elderly
people permits them to move out of a household and set up their own. The two
new households have more income than the one old household (they also have
more expenses). The old couple or individual may now qualify as poor. but only
because social security enabled them to maintain a poor separate household.
Id. at 163-64.
143. This counterproductivity of incrementalism is not restricted to economic programs.
By some analyses, the correctives intended to address social inequalities are themselves the
source of social inequalities. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Piling on the Preferences. 126(25)
U.S. NEws & WORLD Rpr. 88 (June 28, 1999).
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prejudice in our society as ever. The only change has been the target of that
venom. Passing ENDA may very well safeguard our own positions, but it
will probably do nothing to advance the overall goal of social and economic
justice. This realization undercuts the public arguments to pass ENDA at all.
This fact is an embarrassment for the present case because HRC's stan-
dard arguments to advance the cause of ENDA are not framed in the special
circumstances of gay men and lesbians. Instead it argues that to champion
the cause of gay men and lesbians is merely to hope to have society extend
to them ordinary "human rights" from which they have been excluded; in the
words of its Executive Director, Elizabeth Birch, HRC works "to create an
America where lesbian and gay people are ensured of their basic equal
rights." ' " But the organizational name suggests that the ambit of the organi-
zation's goal is wider; that is, that it champions the general cause of human
rights, gathering in all the disenfranchised, that it champions "human rights"
and not "gay rights." In the organization's description of ENDA, HRC
claims, "[It simply affords to all Americans basic employment protection
from discrimination based on irrational prejudice."" 5 As demonstrated, how-
ever, ENDA is by design less encompassing than NRC advertises. This is
not to accuse HRC of advancing the cause of "special rights" for lesbians
and gay men. But it still seems disingenuous to claim that the extension of
employment protections to gay men and lesbians will advance the cause of
human rights, when the expected net outcome will be an increase in security
for gay men and lesbians but no overall improvement in the exercise of hu-
man rights.
Interestingly, an alternative bill actually does what HRC claims for
ENDA: it protects the employment rights of all Americans. The Workplace
Fairness Act [WFA], sponsored by Rep. Brian Bilbray (R-Calif.), "would
protect everyone-a liberal impulse-without giving anyone the 'special
rights' decried by conservatives."'" Bilbray's bill
establishes categories not of people (what conservatives derisively call
'the victim list'), but of job-related qualifications, with an additional twist:
Where the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created lists of types of people and
said, Thou shalt not discriminate for these reasons, Bilbray's proposal
specifies nine factors pertaining to job performance and says, In these in-
stances, thou shalt discriminate, but only for these reasons.
No person shall be subjected "to different standards or treatment on any
basis other than factors pertaining to job performance in connection with
144. Elizabeth Birch, Welcome from the Executive Director, 1999 Louisiana Iluman
Rights Campaign Dinner, Dinner Program, at 1.
145. HRC, ENDA Summary, Oct. 2, 1998 (emphasis added). See also Sen. Comm. on
Labor & Human Resources, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997: Hearings on Sen.
869, 105th Cong. 98 (Oct. 23, 1997) (testimony of Elizabeth Birch) ("ENDA confers only the
most basic, equal rights to everyone, regardless of their sexual orientation.") (emphasis
added).
146. Chandler Burr, All or Nothing at All, 24(3) MOTHER JONFs 62 (May-June 1999).
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employment."'"2 The nine identified "factors" are employment history, abil-
ity and willingness to comply with performance requirements, educational
background, drug or alcohol use, conviction of an offense with the potential
penalty of one year imprisonment, any conflict of interest relating to the em-
ployment, recognized seniority, insubordination, and "ability to work well
with others."'"
The WFA more closely embodies the ideals HRC claims for ENDA.
One would consequently expect HRC and other community representatives
to align themselves behind the WFA as a viable alternative to ENDA. Not
so. "The gay community's official objection is that since the bill does not
specifically cover sexual orientation, employers could use it to fire gays un-
der the theory that homosexuality is inherently disruptive in the work-
place." 49
This objection is directed toward the last criterion, which indeed could
be problematic depending on how it is construed. If people refuse to work
with a homosexual, does this count against the candidate's "ability to work
well with others," so that group prejudice can veto his or her employment?
While this problem seems real enough,'" it is a minor and technically reme-
diable difficulty compared with the major tumults HRC is willing to endure
to pass ENDA, much less a transgender-exclusive ENDA.
The true reason the WFA lacks support from the gay community may be
that it calls our bluff. It takes us at our word about what it is we claim to be
striving for, and compels us to admit that those are merely catchphrases
glossing over what we really want.
[Boston University sociology professor Alan Wolfe] finds the [WFA] bill
intriguing because, he says, "When you start talking seriously about words
like 'merit' and 'freedom' you quickly discover how many people don't
believe in those things. "Bills like this that call attention to our hypocrisy
clear the air. And I have to say that if a bunch of businessmen were called
to a congressional hearing on this bill and asked why they would want to
hire on any basis other than merit, I for one would be very interested in
what they would have to say."'
At the very least we learn from this case the same lesson we saw in ear-
lier sections. Specifically, that incrementalism can be the preferred strategy
even when more elegant wholesale options are available. People find secu-
147. Workplace Fairness Act, H.R. 1980, 106" Cong. § 2 (1999).
148. Id. § 14.
149. Burr, supra note 146, at 63.
150. "In 1987, a Roper poll found that 25% of the respondents to a national survey
would strongly object to working around people who are homosexual, and another 27%
would prefer not to do so; only 45% 'wouldn't mind.'" Gregory M. Herek. Stigna, Prejudice,
and Violence against Lesbians and Gay Men, in JOHN C. GoNsIoRLK & JA.MES D. WENRICH.
HOMoSEXuALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 60. 61 (1991).
151. Id.
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rity and comforting predictability in lists, and will find a way to create one
even if it is not in their best long-term interests.
To rehearse the argument thus far: Lists weaken the primary statutory
prescriptions, even though they are designed to support them. They should
never be encouraged or lightly indulged. Even were there not the formal ar-
guments to show why incrementalism as a form of overspecification defeats
the legal benefit it intends to bestow, the practical example of the effort to
pass ENDA demonstrates that the outcome of piecemeal approaches are
something altogether different from that achieved wholesale. In the name of
fostering equality and unity, the effort generates division and invidious hier-
archies.
The specific example of ENDA is not anomalous. Where list incremen-
talism has been pursued the general outcome has been something other than
what would have been expected had the problem been tackled all at once.
Incrementalism is not an alternative strategy toward the same goal as whole-
sale efforts, but a different method which necessarily ends differently.
V. LIST INCREMENTALISM ASSUMES A DIFFERENT KIND OF HUMAN RIGHT:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
We have seen that serious formal and practical difficulties complicate
the plan to secure gays' rights by incremental steps. Even aware of these dif-
ficulties we might still be persuaded to adopt an incrementalist strategy be-
cause it seems so darned reasonable. But this prima facie reasonableness is
supported by a claim that in the long run incrementalism and wholesale-ism
bring about the same result, so that the choice between them is, in the grand
scheme, irrelevant. The claim that rights are of a kind that can be indiscrimi-
nately advanced by either strategy is probably false. Each strategy nurtures
its own kind of idea about what a "right" is generally, and what a "human
right" is specifically. The difference can be discerned by consideration of the
assumption embedded in the initial claim that incrementalism will advance
human rights. The justifications proposed for choosing an incrementalist
strategy are wrong. The argument here is not that the alternative is necessar-
ily bad, only that it is contrary to the public characterization of the strategy
and is therefore, on that account, false.
The question we must ask is whether "human rights"'52 is a cluster
right'53 one can decompose into bits like "employment non-discrimination
152. Could we avoid this problem, and the discussion to follow, by merely relabeling the
issue so that instead of "human rights" we are instead concerned with, say, "civil rights"?
Probably not, for two reasons. First, the salient terms of this discussion have been chosen for
us by such facts as the name of the "Human Rights Campaign," and that most of the propo-
nents frame the issue in these terms.
There is also another argument that little would be gained by recasting the terminology.
Jack Donnelly distinguishes human from civil rights in the following way: Human rights "are
usually taken to have a special reference to the ways in which states treat their own citizens."
JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS I (1993). He further argues that "claims of
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rights" and between groups like gays and lesbians, or whether it is an indi-
visible, unsegmentable whole that one must presuppose at the outset if one is
to have the category at all. Either alternative is defensible; the argument here
is that they cannot be simultaneously asserted because they are not axioms of
the same philosophical reality. It is not possible is to divide "human rights"
into separate elements and then later reassemble them to arrive in the end
with the original unity of "human rights" because the very act of dividing
denies the unity attributed to it. In short, the ordinary argument in support of
incrementalism advances two mutually exclusive understandings of "human
rights," although in actuality incrementalism fosters one at the expense of
the other. Once the inconsistency has been isolated, the reasonableness of
the strategy vanishes. That demonstration requires the examination of each
of the two terms, "human" and "rights."
A. The Source of Human Rights
Few people contest that "rights," as generally understood, are something
that groups recognize among themselves. For example, Americans turn to
the United States Constitution (as amended) to delineate their basic rights.
Nonliterate societies may depend upon custom and tradition to identify what
duties, responsibilities and privileges are possessed by which categories of
persons.' But some also presume there to be rights that require no formal
grant, written or traditional, to be active. In our own society these are indi-
cated by the Declaration of Independence as those "endowed by our Crea-
tor," rights which we have whether the state recognizes them or not because
their source is not one controlled by the state. These are rights the State can
only choose to recognize and honor or not; it cannot create or bestow them.
That, at least, is the chartering supposition behind the modern category
of the "human right." On what basis is this claim for a class of fundamental
human rights defended? We examine two common authorities for this class
of rights: the natural and the legal.
human rights" are "self-liquidating." By this he means that claims for human nghts are in-
yoked when they "are not effectively guaranteed by national law and practice." Gays' fights
in the United States are thus a matter of human rights; similar battles for racial minorities are,
however, debates about civil (not human) fights because the necessary legal guarantees are in
place for the latter but not the former. Id. at 20-21. Eventually all human fights claims will be
"liquefied" by becoming civil rights claims. Civil fights and human fights are therefore dis-
tinguishable not by the content of the rights claims, or by the source of the claimed fights-
these are the same for both. Instead, the difference lies with the their recognition or lack
thereof by the State.
153. A cluster right is a tight which contains other rights. One example of a cluster right
is the right of ownership, which contains within it the subsidiary rights of usus, fructus, and
abusus. For a discussion of this concept, see JUDITH JARVIS TitoMsoN, TuE REALM OF RIGHITS
55 (1990). For Thomson, the prototypical cluster right is what we call "liberty."
154. ALisON DUNT'ns REN'mu,' & ALAN DUNDES, 1 FoL LAw 1 (1994).
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1. Human Rights Grounded in the Natural Condition of Being Human
The first argument in defense of a category of "human rights" holds that
"human" is a natural category, and that "human rights" are rights innate to
members of that category. These rights are beyond the reach of the state be-
cause it is not within the state's power to deprive us of our humanity other
than, perhaps, to kill us. The contrast is presumably between inalienable hu-
man rights and merely civil rights that the state can control, bestow and
withdraw.'
An example of this kind of argument is the following:
The very term human rights indicates both their nature and their source:
they are the rights that one has simply because one is human. They are
held by all human beings, irrespective of any rights or duties one may (or
may not) have as citizens, members of families, workers, or parts of any
public or private organization or association .... [Because] being human
cannot be renounced, lost or forfeited, human rights are inalienable.'
For this argument to serve as more than a policy statement, the term
"human" must be clarified. What are the criteria by which membership in
the class of "human" is governed? If that word lacks specific meaning, it is
hard to imagine how it could attach to anything so substantive as a legal
right. Rights are the claims and privileges of concrete entities, and some
means are needed to determine who belongs to the class of rights-bearers in
order to determine whether the invoked claim should be honored. As we
shall see, "human" can be assigned some consistent meaning, but not one
which favors the category of "human rights" as normally understood. The
ordinary understandings of "human" and "human rights" cannot co-exist. To
preserve "human rights," "human" will have to be drawn quite narrowly. On
the other hand, to preserve "human," the category of human rights must con-
tain very few members, and certainly nothing like employment non-
discrimination rights. This section scrutinizes the first term, "human," while
the next gives its attention to "rights."
What is it to be human? The primary work of this term is usually to
separate humans from the nonhumans commonly called "animals." The
problem of demarcation between animal and human is philosophically
vague, and hence scientifically inspecific.'" Still, most educated persons be-
gin with the assumption that humans are part of the evolutionary process and
assign them membership in the Animal Kingdom. Whatever humans may be
155. As statements herein have intimated, the exact relationship between "civil rights"
and "human rights" is problematic. Depending on one's theory of choice, they can be either
qualitatively different, distinguished by their source of authority (natural versus legal), or they
can be different stages of development of the same general thing, with civil rights tending to
mature into human rights.
156. DONNELLY, supra note 152, at 19.
157. This problem is framed nicely in the title to Douglas Keith Candland's FERAL
CHILDREN & CLEVER ANIMALS (1993).
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in addition to this, they have their origin here, and are thereby animals. To
contrast animals with humans is therefore perhaps disingenuous at the out-
set. But the distinction is marked; our task is to find out how. How does
"human" relate to the animal "Homo sapiens"?$
The first attempted clarification offered might be that "animal" means
"non-Homo sapiens." Those organisms belonging to the species Homo
sapiens are therefore humans; to be Homo is to be human.
There is a strong sense in which we take this equation to be accurate.
But we have two reasons to reject the contention that "human = Homo
sapiens." First, if "human" and "Homo sapiens" are synonymous we should
be able to employ them identically. That is, we should expect the two to be
linguistically interchangeable. However, this is not the case. Consistently we
find that the criteria for "human" are behavioral, while those for "Homo" are
biological.
This point can be illustrated by considering what we mean when we dis-
cuss "human nature." "Hwnan nature, in general terms, denotes the nature of
man, with more especial reference to his personality and/or character as ac-
quired in the course of socialization and often with further reference to as-
pects of human potential and powers of development."' "
This definition of "human nature" is typical in that that which is "hu-
man" emerges from the organism's socialization into a culture. "Philoso-
phies of human nature reflect beliefs about what people are like after they
have moved through a lengthy socialization process. The concept does not
attempt to reflect beliefs about inherent or innate qualities."' "w Work in this
area does recognize forces that are biological rather than social, but these are
not collected under the label "human nature" but instead "psychic unity."
This perspective holds that the organism left to develop in isolation
might survive but would never be quite human, regardless of its genotype.6 '
That is, Homo is not human where it lacks enculturation. Consequently, be-
158. The question has been phrased in other terms. Where here the contrast is between
"human" and "Homo", others mark the same broad distinction as arising between persons and
mere human beings. See DEREK PARFIT, REAsONS AND PERSONS 322 (1984). The first is to be
preferred. Some legal systems explicitly restrict the status of personhood in ways which arc
discomforting. The Roman Catholic canon law, for example, accords the status of "person"
only to those who are baptized. CODE OF CANON LAW can. 96.
159. E.H. Volkart, Human Nature, in A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCE"CI-S 306 (1964)
(emphasis added).
160. L.S. WRIGHTSMAN, AssUMPTIONS ABOUT HUMAN NATURE 46 (2d ed. 1992).
161. An early articulation of this position is found in Aristotle's PotTics:
an individual incapable of membership of a polls is not, strictly speaking, a human
being, but rather a (non-human) animal, while one who is self-sufficient apart from
the polis is superhuman, or, as Aristotle puts it, a god.... [One] cannot be a hu-
man being except in the context of a polis.
C.C.W. Taylor, Politics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 239 (1995). This pos-
sibility raises the issue of feral children, some of whom are described by Candland. supra
note 157.
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ing Homo does not entail being human, falsifying the assumption that "hu-
man = Homo sapiens."
The same point can be argued from the opposite direction. Instead of
showing that not all Homo are human, we might argue that some non-Homo
are human. Regardless of its genotype, an enculturated organism may be de-
finitionally human. If culture and humanness are strictly correlated, "then
some chimpanzees may be human or human-like." 6' The force of this fact
has become so strong that "a growing number of scientists argue that [chim-
panzees] belong in our own genus Homo."'63 If "human rights" is tied to our
humanness, which in turn is definitionally equated with our status as Homo,
and further, if the higher primates are embraced by that genera either literally
or proximately, then, by conclusion, we will have to accept that these ani-
mals are entitled to the full panoply of human rights. This outcome will
please some more than others.
These facts jointly force the conclusion that while Homo and human are
highly correlated, they are not equivalent. Even if in practice they are largely
co-occurring, they are nevertheless distinctively different categories and
cannot be defined in terms of one another.
The logical conclusion that human and Homo are nonequivalent catego-
ries can be further illustrated through the widely ranging historical judg-
ments about whether a particular token of Homo qualifies as human.
Prior to the Middle Ages humans and animals were viewed as biologi-
cally permeable categories, meaning that individuals could just as easily
move in one direction as the other: Humans become animals (werewolves,
vampires), and animals become humans (the characters of Aesop's fables).
Later behavioral category markers opened the possibility that even certain
members of Homo routinely failed to qualify as human. If being "rational,"
for example, is the definitional human trait (Feinberg identifies this as "the
capability most commonly favored for this role"'), then persons who act in
ways judged "irrational" (e.g., women in general, peasants in French folk
tales) may come off as less than human. 5 This trend can so overexercise it-
self that by tighter and tighter constriction no actual humans exist. If true ra-
tionality is the possession of only the theoretical philosopher, only he might
be human. But, in the last analysis, true knowledge is an impossible goal that
162. WILLIAM NOBLE & IAIN DAVIDSON, HUMAN EVOLUTION, LANGUAGE AND MIND 83
(1996). See also FRANS DE WAAL, THE APE AND THE SUSHI MASTER: CULTURAL R-FLECTIONS
OF A PRIMATOLOGIST (2001).
163. Joseph Hart, Chimps are People Too: But Should Their Rights Ape Our Own?. 99
UTNE READER 20 (May-June 2000).
164. JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 91 (1973).
165. Joyce E. Salisbury, Human Beasts and Bestial Humans in the Middle Ages. in
ANIMAL ACTS: CONFIGURING THE HUMAN IN WESTERN HISTORY 15 (1997). Thus, for example,
women for Aristotle were "'necessary deformities', not quite human." Stephen R. Clark, Is
Humanity a Natural Kind, in WHAT IS AN ANLMAL? 17, 26 (Tim Ingold ed., 1994).
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no one achieves, so no one at all is human.'" Similar absurd outcomes result
whatever the definitional human attribute is taken to be.
"Human" is obviously a vague term, and not merely at its boundaries.
But suppose that, despite the problems outlined above, we stipulated for
practical reasons the referent of "human" to be the species Homo: any organ-
ism belonging to this animal species is entitled to the full claims of "human
rights," be they fetuses, stem cells, or whatever. Would advocates of human
rights approve? Perhaps not, if they are aware of some of the ramifications.
Most would probably have no difficulty accepting some of the obvious
practical benefits of this position. It does have the attractive virtue of seem-
ing to definitively resolve the abortion controversy. Homo is a status con-
ferred by genetic code; a fetus is consequently Homo, and, by this standard,
also human, with all that that entails. But such parsimony in some areas is
not without costs in others. Some advocates for animals imply that human
rights are such that they encompass animals. Feinberg believes that "a hu-
man right held by animals is not excluded by definition."'"7 Those convinced
animals should be included within human rights would not embrace the
"human = Homo" equation.
The most attractive aspect of this position is that it does seem to clearly
answer to whom human rights should be assigned. But this clarity may be
illusory. Even if we restrict ourselves to the biological criteria implied by the
term Homo, what exactly earns someone this honorific? Is it the number of
chromosomes? Some people have extras: are they therefore not sufficiently
Homo to deserve human rights? If not chromosomes, what? Particular
genes? This route seems unhelpful given that species are not defined by hav-
ing a specific gene, but by having been drawn from a specific gene pool. It is
therefore possible that no specific gene appears in every uncontested mem-
ber of a species. An analogy can be made to the attempt to draw conclusions
about population averages from a single specimen: by definition the attempt
is nonsensical. Likewise, no genetic attribute of any individual can be taken
as definitive for a species.
If it is not genes, what then makes someone human? Odds are that
whatever trait is identified, here too some presumptive bearers of human
rights will be disqualified as they are proven to lack the required attribute.
Recall, however, that our primary problem is not to identify to whom
human rights apply, but what the grounds are for recognizing the category at
all. There are other difficulties in using the "human = Homo" equation to
perform this work. How can biological species membership confer the moral
status implied by possessing a right? The assertion with which we began was
not merely that human rights are perfectly correlated with Homo status, but
the stronger claim that Homo status grounds the human rights. The rights are
166. Gregory B. Stone, The Philosophical Beast: On Boccaccio's Tale of Cimone. in
ANIMAL AcTs: CoNFIGuRNG THE HUMAN IN WFS -m HISTORY (1997).
167. FEINBERG, supra note 164, at 86.
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a consequence, not a mere correlative, of our membership within this spe-
cies.
The naturalistic fallacy says that we cannot derive an ought from an is.
Human rights are, by definition, statements of what ought to pertain; bio-
logical species is a description of what is the case. Unless a way is found to
bridge this gap, mere membership in Homo can never serve as grounds for
human rights.'
Our illustration above highlights that whatever trait is identified as es-
sential to being human-be it achieved via enculturation or endowed by bi-
ology-some members of Homo will lack that trait. The fetus, for example,
has achieved nothing, and hence cannot be covered by any definition of hu-
man as encultured. On the other hand, the brute fact of biological variability
means that, if we select a genetic criterion for "human," some non-Homo
specimens might possess it. Adopting this standard also raises the issue of
how much deviation from cultural values is tolerable before one is judged
"inhuman." Undesirable outcomes seem imminent regardless of which path
is chosen. This conundrum has been noticed before:
If, conversely, 'mankind' stands for all of those, of whatever descent and
lineage, who display a devotion to the values that we serve--civility and
rational debate, for example-we have to face the fact that not all biologi-
cally human beings can be expected to do so, and some biologically non-
human ones might, at least in some degree. The problem, notoriously, is
that the harder we make it to meet the qualifications of 'real humanity' (so
as to exclude dolphins, chimpanzees, squids and honeybees), the more
creatures of clearly human descent we also push beyond the pale.... Ei-
ther most human beings may rightly be treated 'like animals', when we
deal with them at a practical level, and when we try to explain their behav-
iour; or a good many animals should not be treated like that either."'
So "human" can be assigned positive content. The term is not inherently
meaningless. But when the category is restricted adequately to clarify the
term, it generates outcomes that are not easily reconciled with our ordinary
understandings as to whom human rights should apply. In either case, enti-
tlement to "human rights" is a rebuttable presumption rather than an invio-
late possession.
We are apparently left with two choices. Either the term "human" is un-
defined, in which case it is meaningless and so too is anything it modifies,
such as "human rights." Alternatively, if "human" is defined, it will not de-
marcate the political class of rights-holders we expected. In sum, there either
are no human rights at all, or the holders of such rights as might follow from
168. Judith Thomson claims that she has solved this problem. THOMSON, supra 153. at I-
33. I, for one, am unconvinced by her argument that she has successfully found a way to ar-
gue from facts to values.
169. Clark, supra note 165, at 28.
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a reasonably specific understanding of the term "human" are very different
from the popular idea of them as endowments of a natural kind.' 0
We may pause momentarily to ascertain the impact thus far of this ar-
gument for incrementalism. Very often incrementalism is defended because
it advances society toward the achievement of some other goal (e.g., the full
recognition of human rights) rather than it being designed to cure the spe-
cific ills of a particular group. In those situations, the reasonableness of the
immediate proposal, such as ENDA, depends upon the reasonableness of the
ultimate goal.
The examination of the "human" component of human rights results in
the conclusion that either there are no such rights, or they are of a qualita-
tively different number and kind than commonly supposed. If there are no
"human" rights per se, then incrementalist proposals parasitic on that objec-
tive must similarly fail. In the alternative, if there are human rights, the bur-
den remains upon the incrementalist strategist to demonstrate that the spe-
cific proposal at issue belongs in that very limited category. Freedom from
employment discrimination based upon sexual orientation likely does not
qualify. In any event, given the contestability of the concept of human rights,
ENDA advocates would be better advised to argue its passage on its intrinsic
merit alone, rather than depend upon the reflected deference afforded some
other, higher end which ENDA purportedly advances.
2. Are Human Rights Legal Rights?
The attempt to identify our biological status or our natural condition as
the source for human rights fails to support the ordinary understanding of the
term. If there are to be "human rights," the authority for the category must
lie elsewhere than in the elusive status of being "human." We turn our atten-
tion, then, toward the second term, that of "rights."
"Human rights" is necessarily a subset of the larger class of general
rights. For instruction on this broader category of rights in general we turn to
Judith Thomson's important volume of political philosophy, The Realm of
Rights.' One of her many projects is to sever moral (human, natural) rights
from the class of legal rights. The issue arises in part because of the influ-
ence of early theorizing by Wesley Hohfeld. While he made a significant
contribution to the theory of rights in his discussion of duties and claims, he
170. Falling between this consideration of any natural source of human rights and that in
the following section, the social attribution of fights, is the curious assertion that human rights
are not the rights we need for health, economic security, etc., but are rather the rights we need
to live lives of human "dignity." See JACK DONNELY, INTENA INAL HU.IAN RGitTs 21
(1993). It is unclear what such a claim means, and in any event advances our argument not at
all but only changes the terms of the debate. We are still left to ascertain the source of "dig-
nity."
'
171. JUDrrH JARViS THOMSON, THt REALM OF RItGTs 55 (1990).
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specifically limited his discussion to legal rights."' The question then raised
is the relationship of legal to moral rights.
Positivists claim that moral rights are only legal rights. Just as there are
no crimes other than those acts statutorily criminalized, so too are there no
rights except those legislatively or constitutionally granted. Thomson dis-
agrees. She wants to show that legal and moral rights are neither synony-
mous (that the set of legal rights is not identical to the set of moral rights),
nor subsets one of the other (all moral rights are not legal rights, nor are all
legal rights moral rights). She dramatizes her point with the following sce-
nario:
For suppose a law is passed in our community which declares that there is
henceforth no penalty attached to murdering Jews, and moreover that there
is henceforth a penalty attached to attempting to prevent the murder of
Jews. Here is Bloggs, who hates a certain Jew, namely Smith. Does
Bloggs now have a legal privilege as regards Smith of murdering Smith?
Does Bloggs now have a legal claim against me that I not attempt to pre-
vent his murdering Smith? If Positivism is correct, the answer to both
questions is yes. But then at least legal rights are not members of the ge-
nus rights. No doubt Bloggs has a legal privilege of murdering Smith, on
this understanding of legal privileges; but he has no privilege of murdering
Smith. No doubt I infringe a legal claim of Bloggs' if I attempt to prevent
him from murdering Smith, on this understanding of legal claims; but he
has no claim against me that I not do this-I infringe no claim he really
has if I proceed to do it. 
7
1
She believes that this hypothetical highlights the difference between
moral rights and legal rights. We can possess the legal right to do something
(kill Smith) without thereby acquiring the moral right to do that same
thing.1 74 Because some legal rights are obviously not moral rights, the rela-
tionship between the two is neither that of synonyms nor subsets, but instead
constitutes a third relationship: Legal rights and moral rights are independent
but intersecting categories.
Whatever Thomson's hypothetical accomplishes, it is not as much as
she hopes. Thomson has shown that not all moral rights are legal rights, and
172. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).
173. Id. at 75.
174. See SHELLY KAGEN, NORMATIVE ETHics 9 (1998):
[T]he substantive moral claims of normative ethics should not be confused with
descriptive claims about what people actually do, or about what various groups (or
individuals) think people should do. But there is something else normative ethics
should not be confused with: the law. Determining what people morally should do
is not the same thing as determining what the law says they should do. For the law
may permit some particular act, even though that act is immoral; and the law may
forbid an act, even though that act is morally permissible, or even morally re-
quired.
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that not all legal rights are moral rights. We can grant her this. Her goal is to
deflect the Positivistic interpretation of law, and we can stipulate that she has
succeeded.
But she frames her conclusions in overly broad terms. It is one thing to
conclude that there are extra-legal sources for rights. That result does not
force upon us the conclusion that therefore a natural source for rights exists.
Thomson has adequately demonstrated that "our rights have different
sources."'75 But her "proof' is framed in purely dichotomous terms, the legal
versus the natural, so that, if some rights are nonlegal, by default there must
be natural (or human) rights. We have natural rights "just in case [the claim]
is not a pure social claim."'76 But her conclusion is valid only if legal claims
exhaust the kinds of nonnatural claims that can exist.
Unfortunately for her argument, there exist other social authorities for
rights besides the law, such as custom and tradition, or "folk law."'" That
fact opens the possibility that, despite the story of Bloggs presented above,
natural rights still do not exist. Rights, by whatever name they are called,
civil or human or something else, exist only to the extent they are grounded
in social premises, legal or extra-legal. The introduction of a category of
"natural" rights accomplishes no explanatory work (at least in Thomson's
story) and therefore by Ockham's razor it should be disallowed. 71
Thomson view is specifically vulnerable to this criticism because, for
her, natural rights are merely a residual category; they are those claims
which are nonsocial. They possess no positive definitional attributes of their
own. This is her solution to the problems of trying to assign positive content
to the term "human" outlined in the previous section. If the category is
empty, even by her estimate there must be no natural rights. She only arrives
at the conclusion that natural rights exist because she equates "legal" with
"social," and having demonstrated that nonlegal rights exist, she feels justi-
fied in presuming that nonsocial rights exist, and therefore in asserting that
natural rights must necessarily exist.
In seeming support of Thomson's dichotomous categories of natural and
legal rights, Feinberg makes the following distinction:
A man has a legal right when the official recognition of his claim (as
valid) is called for by the governing rules. This definition, of course,
hardly applies to moral rights, but that is not because the genus of which
moral rights are a species is something other than claims. A man has a
moral right when he has a claim, the recognition of which is called for-
175. THOMsON, supra note 171, at 76.
176. Id. at 274.
177. RENTrELN & DuNDES, supra note 154, at 1.
178. "Ockham's razor" refers to the philosophical principle attributed to William of
Ockham, a fourteenth century theologian. As commonly phrased, the principle states that ex-
planatory entities should not be multiplied beyond those necessary to the problem. If variable
X and Y will explain phenomenon A just as well as X, Y. and Z, then Ockham's razor "cuts
out" Z from the preferred explanation. The usual application of the razor is to eliminate su-
pernatural explanatory entities (God, spirit, soul) from explanations for natural phenomena.
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not (necessarily) by legal rules-but by moral principles, or the principles
of an enlightened conscience. 79
But Feinberg makes explicit what is hidden in Thomson's text. Moral
rights are legitimated by "moral principles, or the principles of an enlight-
ened conscience." Whence the source of moral principles or those principles
of an enlightened conscience, if not one's social environment? Can anyone,
even a detached philosopher, claim to be other than a product of his time and
place? If moral rights are chartered by socially derived principles, then they
are themselves social products, and the distinction between legal and moral
rights does not hinge, as Thomson hopes, on the assertion that one is social
and the other not.'80
This problem becomes obvious in Thomson's text through her repeated
invocation of moral "data," which are only her private intuitions that she
thinks are so obvious and inarguable that they constitute evidence for the ex-
istence of a nonsocially grounded moral right. As she says, "I take much of
the stuff of morality as given.' 81 One may ask, "Given by whom or what?"
And again the answer must be, "Society."
One example of these bald assertions is her claim that "One ought not
torture babies to death for fun ... is surely a necessary truth."'82 We can con-
cede that it is indeed a true statement about our own public morality without
agreeing that it is a necessary truth. Aristotle, for example, claims that babies
are like animals;'83 and Descartes believes that animals are like machines.'
84
179. JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 67 (1973).
180. A recent invocation of this principle was made by the Vatican. In its buildup toward
an apology "for the Roman Catholic Church's historical failings," the document entitled
Memory and Reconciliation pointed out that "many act of earlier centuries cannot be judged
solely by contemporary moral standards." Pope Releases Preface to Coming Apology, TIIIl
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 2, 2000, at A13. Moral principles are temporally rela-
tive in this way if they are based upon something which is itself temporally relative, like soci-
ety. However this claim comports with the Vatican's broader stance on human rights, here
they are depending upon the belief that they are not grounded in immutable features. Other-
wise, what is immoral to our eyes today would have been necessarily immoral at the time they
were committed, a charge the clergy would prefer to avoid.
181. THOMSON, sutpra note 171, at 4. Thomson has here fallen victim to the weakness
noticed by Simpson:
The mass of people usually find that their own introspective judgment of right and
wrong, the edicts of the authorities accepted by them, and the conventions of their
society coincide rather closely. They coincide because their sources are related and
because the individuals in society tend to modify them or to ignore their discrep-
ancies so as to produce the illusion, at least, of coincidence.
GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON, THE MEANING OF EvOLUTION 295 (1950).
182. THOMSON, supra note 171, at 18.
183. For example, Aristotle favorably compares animals and children throughout the Ni.
COMACHEAN ETHics. See, e.g., Aristotle, THE NICOMACIlEAN ETliCS 30, 73, 243 (J.E.C. Well-
don trans., Prometheus, 1987).
184. A complete discussion of Descartes's belief that animals are mere automata is
available in DAIS1E & MICHAEL RADNER, ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS (1996).
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Surely we have no necessary repugnance against breaking our machines for
amusement. That we do not have this attitude toward babies is therefore a
contingent truth, not a necessary one."
The outcome is this: Thomson has adequately shown that moral rights
are not reducible to legal rights. However, she invalidly uses this result to
claim that there are rights that are not social, and that, by implication, natural
rights exist. Her conclusions do not follow from her argument. In fact, given
her position that natural rights, if they exist, are only a residual category, the
conservative result of this discussion parallels that of the previous section in
that we again find no coherent argument that natural rights exist. Society is
answerable in this regard to no higher authority, be it god or nature."' At
best, because all rights are grants by society, "human rights" covers only
those social grants of rights that are universal because some brute facts of
social living, in any culture or time, are likewise universal. But even if uni-
versal social grants, human rights are still merely social grants. They are not
a claim superseding society's order. To the extent they might appear other-
wise, this is only because of a disagreement about which society is the
proper reference standard. Do we, for example, look to the specific local so-
ciety, or toward some kind of hegemonic world culture?
3. Summary
If rights generally are better recognized as social rights (whether legal or
not) then so too must this be said of human rights because what is true of the
genus must be true of the species. This result has implications. For one, there
is no such thing as an "inalienable" right. What society gives, it can take
away (Thomson seems largely sympathetic to this claim in her later chap-
ters). This would be harder to argue were the question whether the state can
deprive the individual of a biological endowment or a supernatural gift. But
that is not the case of rights; the sole source of rights is society. Some rights
might be so fundamental to the healthy functioning of any human society
that society would be unwise to eliminate such rights. But any persuasive
claim that the society lacks that power cannot be built upon the premise that
185. Similarly, Thomson claims that "Isn't it obvious that X's throwing a child into the
water is something bad, and that Y's jumping into the water to save it is something good?
How could anyone think otherwise?" THOMSON, supra note 171. at 131. Here's how:
There is no Merit in saving an innocent Babe ready to drop into the Fire: The Ac-
tion is neither good nor bad, and what Benefit soever the Infant received, we only
obliged our selves; for to have seen it fall, and not strove to hinder it. would have
caused a Pain [to ourselves], which Self-preservation compell'd us to prevent.
BERNARD MANDEvI-LF, THE FABLE OF THE BEEs 1:56 (1732). This counterexample does not
mean that Thomson is wrong, but only that what she assumes needs no supportive argument
actually does.
186. It should not be assumed that I take this to be a good tlung. only that it is a true
thing.
20011
55
Donovan: Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental Extension of Right
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
these rights are natural, or that they inhere directly to the condition of being
"human." However attractive this argument appears, it does not survive scru-
tiny.
B. Human Rights: All of Us or Each of Us?
We have now answered the preliminary question about the prima facie
sensibility of the concept of "human rights." If the term has a utility beyond
political posturing, it most defensibly refers to socially granted rights. This
general conclusion might be further restricted to those socially granted rights
that stipulate prudent rules of group boundary behaviors on matters which
are universal to members of our species cross-culturally and transtempo-
rally."S7 Now that we know what "human rights" is, we can move to the sec-
ond phase of our argument by examining that category's internal structure in
preparation to consider how these results impact the choice between incre-
mentalism and wholesale-ism.
First, this characterization of human rights supports category divisibil-
ity. Human rights are social grants and not biological endowments. Because
societies change and develop, their understanding and grants of rights to
their members must also change and develop. In other words, rights will
necessarily be recognized and enforced piecemeal. The category of "human
rights" is therefore a cluster right that has accreted over time as new rights
have been identified and new categories of persons encompassed. We set
aside the task of itemizing a list of those parts that constitute this cluster
right.88
187. The foreseeable objection to this conclusion is that it seems to imply that if one so-
ciety declines to recognize a right, that right is not a human right. Attempts would be made to
illustrate this objection through some detail of the Nazi atrocities. This Article is not the place
to demonstrate how the conclusion that human rights are social grants of universal occurrence
does not require accepting those same Nazi atrocities, or to refrain from characterizing those
atrocities as violations of human rights. But easily imagined future clarifications can make
that point.
For example, although the argument here is being phrased in terms of societies, a subse-
quent, more nuanced discussion may find the appropriate level of comparison to be instead
cultural. In that case, so long as the preponderance of societies within a cultural tradition rec-
ognizes the rights, and if all cultures recognize the rights, then the rights are human rights de-
spite sporadic deviance at the level of a specific society. Or a more careful examination could
find that there is no right at issue that Nazi Germany failed to recognize; they merely did not
extend that right to all persons. In that case, the refined result could be that the social recogni-
tion required is not what the right-bestowers grant to others, but what they grant to them-
selves. If, for example, we wish to include a right to marriage among the "human rights," and
the Nazis granted themselves this right but withheld it from Jews, in our cross-cultural com-
parison in search of universal social grants of rights, it would be upon the former and not the
latter that we would focus, and which would fail to judge the Nazi society an exception.
Any true rebuttal to this characterization of "human rights" will have to be deeper than
mere invocation of apparent extremes that at first blush seem to be counterexamples.
188. A review of the list of formally recognized "human rights" by the United Nations
does little to persuade one of argument that such rights are based upon anything "natural." See
JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HumAN RIGHTS 9 (1993). Some are merely too vague to be
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We next consider the relation of the parts to the whole. Again, the pre-
vious discussion leans toward the view that the category of "human rights" is
(like "ownership rights") a cluster comprised of other, more elemental rights.
"Human rights" are synthesized from independent, lower-level rights. Bind-
ing the individual elements into the single category of "human rights" are the
universal facts of social living. ' " Critically, there will be nothing inherent in
a constituent right that marks it as belonging to the cluster right of "human
rights." Reversing the direction of analysis can be very difficult, if not im-
possible. That is to say, "human rights" cannot be easily dissected to dis-
cover its components. What qualifies as a human right is historically contin-
gent, and not logically necessary.
Since human rights is a bottom-up and not a top-down category, the
higher level cannot be invoked to justify the lower. Each alleged fundamen-
tal right must be justified on its own terms and not by appeal to an antici-
pated, emergent category of human rights. Arguments, for example, that
ENDA should be supported because employment non-discrimination is a
fundamental human right therefore make no sense. If employment non-
discrimination were truly a human right, ENDA is superfluous; if it is not a
human right, ENDA cannot be defended on this basis.
What could happen, though, is this: If a survey of world cultures reveals
a central tendency to recognize employment non-discrimination rights, then
we may inferentially conclude that this right belongs within the superordi-
nate class of "human rights," with all that that might entail. The major lesson
to draw here is that whereas the first argument initially asserts human rights
to garner support to recognize a subordinate right, the second reverses the
logical order. It begins with the fact of predominant recognition that a right
has been recognized, and then concludes with the categorization of that right
as a human right.
We can see that two contradictory views about human rights are in play.
On the one hand, the ordinary view of human rights is that they belong to
"all of us" by virtue of our natural condition, which is somehow intended to
be captured by the term "human." Efforts to identify with precision what is
being "captured" have been disappointing, but the category is typically taken
as self-evidently valid and as roughly synonymous with the status of Homo
sapiens. This understanding of human rights not only does not require a
gatekeeper separating the right-possessors from all others (the species
helpful: Is the right to "life" a right to live, or a right not to have one's life taken by the state?
In other words, does this human right make a claim that the State has a duty to preserve life.
or merely not to terminate it? Other items on the list are too culturally specific to be credible:
The alleged human right to free trade unions and leisure time and paid holidays. Given the
difficulty in isolating any natural endowment which entails any rights at all. it would asking
too much indeed to find one which required trips to Disney World.
189. The recognition of human rights, given this discussion, hinges on the determination
of the right at issue being found to be a sociocultural human universal. That means that identi-
fication of these rights is a clear task for anthropology, and not for the juridical or political
sciences.
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boundary is presumed to serve that function), but the very suggestion to the
contrary becomes itself a violation of human rights since by definition there
can be no class of human nonpossessors of the right at issue. This kind of
human rights supports the wholesale approach to rights activism. Within this
strategy human rights is a premise in an argument that non-discrimination
rights should be granted because they are human rights.
Concurrent with this understanding of "human" as "biological descent"
runs another understanding of "human" as describing the essential virtues of
an entity. Here human rights belong potentially to "each of us," recognized
in any entity that has achieved certain levels of socialization and moral de-
velopment. This understanding does require a gatekeeper of some kind to as-
certain whether any given entity (Homo or non-Homo) has achieved the re-
quired level of socialization or moral development and would thereby be
entitled to claim the status of "human" and the possession of human rights.
This understanding of human rights easily lends itself to incrementalism, as
new groups of persons aspire toward inclusion within the certified class.
Here the label "human rights" is a conclusion supported by the accord of the
predominant individual experiences of particular societies.
In thumbnail form, incrementalism favors the achievement of human
rights rather than their ascription as natural entitlements. The existence of a
list of groups to whom certain rights are extended becomes reasonable be-
cause these rights are differentially granted by society accordingly as those
achievements are attained. The list is a record of those social grants. Within
the context of list incrementalism, "human rights" emerges as an inductive
conclusion after surveying the broad, cross-cultural patterns of the social
grants of rights.
Wholesale efforts, marked by the more radical and revolutionary at-
tempt to complete change at one fell swoop, eschew the list. Wholesale-ism
effort is reasonable only if it assumes that no discrimination need be made
between current rights-possessors and all others because it denies that this
difference can exist. The theory of human rights that buttresses this argu-
ment must be that these rights are natural endowments entailed by member-
ship within the category "human" into which one is born. Within the frame-
work of wholesale political strategies, "human rights" is the premise of a
deductive argument justifying the recognition of the already-possessed right
in a particular group.
Incrementalism and wholesale-ism rights strategies each depends upon
and reinforce contradictory understandings of "human rights." Incremental-
ism favors a view of human rights as achieved, granted, and as inductive
conclusions; the wholesale approach presumes that human rights are natural,
recognized, and as deductive premises.
Accept for present purposes that this analysis of human rights has merit.
Incrementalism supports the perspective on human rights that this discussion
has identified as the most rational, albeit not the one with which people are
most comfortable or familiar. In this the reader may find, finally, one argu-
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ment that supports incrementalist strategies for rights extensions. That might
well be true. But the standard argument for incrementalism is not that it fos-
ters a correct understanding of human rights, but that it supports the same
understanding implied by wholesale-ism. The end result does not differ be-
tween the two strategies, but only the means.
This assertion is false. Simply put, incrementalism and wholesale-ism
are emphatically not different routes to the same outcome. Each strategy fos-
ters its own kind of human rights, and the social and political possibilities
under the two kinds of human rights are dramatically different. Anyone
claiming that incrementalism will in the long run lead to the same final out-
come as would wholesale-ism is woefully mistaken. Incrementalism may be
the better choice, but it is not a different route to the same goal.
As applied to our specific case study of the push for a federal ENDA,
the choice of incrementalism by HRC is fatally flawed. It invokes human
rights as a premise in an argument that concludes that ENDA should be en-
acted. But in an environment of consistently applied incrementalism, human
rights can only serve in an argument as an inductive conclusion. HRC, in
other words, is "mixing its metaphors." One or the other must go. If HRC
wishes to use human rights as an argumentative premise, it must adopt a
wholesale strategy to employment non-discrimination and refuse to settle for
any bill which excludes transgenders. Or, if it wishes to continue to bar
transgendered persons from ENDA protections, it must eschew arguing in
defense of ENDA on the grounds that it will promote the cause of human
rights.
VI. DOES REFUSING TO ADOPT INCREMENTALIST STRATEGIES PROMOTE
UNHEALTHY EXTREMISM?
If incrementalism is bad either intrinsically or as implemented, what is
the committed advocate of rights to conclude? If the compromise associated
with incrementalism is precluded as a deliberate strategy, does this mean that
the serious philosophical thinker must adopt a stance of shrill and strident
extremism lest she risk intellectual inconsistency?
No. We have only discussed the most defensible position for each indi-
vidual voice in a particular debate. We have not attempted to characterize the
nature of the full discussion. In that discussion, each advocate does not as-
sume a responsibility to anticipate the final outcome, or to reflect that pro-
spective result and adopt it as her own. Quite the contrary, in fact, is true. If
the debate is to be full and complete, each participant must adhere to her
own position and endeavor to represent it persuasively and thoroughly.
American legal practice already models its courtroom procedure on this
advocacy principle. Each side is expected to argue the merits of the case in
the light most favorable to its client. The adversaries do not discuss between
themselves the relative merits of the case and reach a consensus about the
just outcome. "The lawyer... is an advocate whose role is not to reach the
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closest approximation to the truth, but to put forward the strongest case for
the client."'" In fact, the process can be gummed up when persons abandon
their adversarial roles to act as objective fact-finders. 9 ' Finding the truth
among the conflicting claims and differently accentuated accounts is left to a
third-party finder of fact, either a jury or a judge. The system works best
when each party hews firmly to the version of the story that it believes to be
true. "Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the
question."'92
The same is true in most debates. Each side of a debate about rights ex-
tension should press the full weight of its argument. To do less is unreason-
able and disingenuous, and fails to provide the necessary grist for the mill of
third-party evaluation. If there is a reasonable middle ground to be sought,
that task remains to the policy-equivalent of the judicial finder of fact, either
a legislative body or the electorate directly.
Unwavering adherence to one's position becomes a fault only when the
same person functions as both advocate and adjudicator/decision-maker. In
all other circumstances our political system presumes strong position advo-
cacy. For this reason, to conclude that incrementalism should not be adopted
as a deliberate strategy does not entail the collapse of our political discus-
sions. Just the opposite: When those discussions will be resolved by third-
parties, incrementalism undermines the process. Chaos is more likely to fol-
low compromise, not the principled stance.
Even if this were not the case, however, we should hesitate to attach a
negative connotation to the term "extremism." While extremists may be
viewed as indecorous, they are sometimes necessary. Martin Luther King,
Jr., regarded as a moderate voice in the racial tensions of the sixties, earned
that high regard only after initial success and in contrast to later, more vio-
lent agitators. When he began, he was himself viewed as the extremist. In his
famous "Letter from Birmingham Jail" he responded to critics among his
fellow African-American religious who called his activities "unwise and un-
timely."
I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disap-
pointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable
conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward
freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klan, but the
white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who pre-
fers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace
which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in
the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action";
who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's
freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly ad-
vises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow under-
190. STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, ED., THE EvOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAl. ASSESSMENTS AS
EvIDENCE IN THE COURTS 155 (1989).
191. Id. at 303.
192. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (quoting Lord Eldon).
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standing from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute mis-
understanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more
bewildering than outright rejection.1 93
Our adoration of tranquility over agitation holds regardless whether the
tranquility is stagnant or the agitation creative. Sometimes forceful measures
are demanded.
But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an extrem-
ist, as I continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a measure
of satisfaction from the label. Was not Jesus an extremist for love: "Love
your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you,
and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you."... So
the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extrem-
ists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be ex-
tremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice?'
In answer to our question, then, refusing to reflexively endorse incre-
mentalist strategies need not result in excessive divisiveness on the political
stage. Moreover we should remember that extremism, while perhaps uncom-
fortable to watch because it challenges us to commit ourselves to principles
we ordinarily merely mouth, is not necessarily unhealthy to the body politic.
CONCLUSION
"If the goal of visionaries is to make a quantum leap forward, the goal of
pragmatists is to make a percentage improvement-incremental, measur-
able, predictable progress. "'9'
Despite the commonsensical acceptability of this characterization of the
"leaper" versus the "incrementalist lister," embedded within it are at least
three questionable assumptions. First, that there is actually a choice to be
made, that one can either leap or list, with either being potentially accept-
able. But the formal argument has shown that there may be no such choice
between possible alternatives, especially if the desire is, as claimed, "im-
provement" or "progress." List incrementalism is a form of adding detail in
the quest of increasing precision, which, as Lieber argues, actually leads to
less "improvement" and no "progress" by reducing clarity and increasing
imprecision. 96 If the statement of the goal is accurate, one must choose
wholesale "leaps."
The second assumption behind the epigraph is that even were incremen-
talism available as a strategy at least in theory, it can be a good one in prac-
193. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail. April 16, 1963. available at
http://www.almaz.com.nobel/peace/MLK-jail.html.
194. Id
195. MALcoLM GLADWELL THETIPPING POINT 198 (2000) (quoting Geoffrey Moore).
196. See supra Section III.
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tice. The practical argument is illustrated in at least one instance, that being
the push for a federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act that includes
protections for gay men and lesbians, where the costs outweighed the poten-
tial benefits. If, as we are told, the goal of this legislation is to assure equal
treatment for us all, incrementalism fails because we advance at the price of
leaving behind others such as the transgendered. If the goal is simply to ad-
vance our own cause, in this case at least incrementalism is still a failure be-
cause by so narrowly describing the basis of the new protections, even most
of our own group is no longer protected; a gay man can just as easily be fired
for gender role infractions as for sexual orientation. Analysis of other at-
tempts at incrementalist improvement of the disadvantaged lead us to believe
that the ENDA example is not unique.
Finally, the above quote depends upon a linear image of progress, in
which a leap is just as good, in the end, for getting from point A to point B
as incremental strategies would be. But the philosophical argument has
shown that this is not the case. Once your feet have left the ground, which
path they land upon depends upon the strategy taken and the entailments
therein. Incremental steps require an understanding of human rights as so-
cially achieved, while wholesale jumps imply an endowment of moral rights
somehow emerging from our biological natures. Regardless of which view
of human rights you favor, you cannot say they are the same.
The critic might say that this has all been much ado about nothing.
Rights clearly advance incrementally, so incrementalism is the truer descrip-
tion of what actually happens. Nothing here challenges that assessment.
However, the task before us was not to find the better post facto description,
but to identify the superior a priori strategy for rights advancement. The
analogy here would be with David Hume's devastating argument against in-
ductive reasoning. He argues not that it doesn't happen, or even that it
doesn't work, but only that it is inherently irrational and cannot thereby be
the basis of any further arguments.'97 We remain free to think inductively,
but we can no longer claim that in so doing we are being strictly reasonable.
The brute fact that incrementalism "happens" does not mean that incre-
mentalism is rational or that it should be deliberately pursued, much less that
we are free to ignore the long-range implications of adopting an incremental-
ist position. This article does not claim to have definitively demonstrated the
foolishness of incrementalism. Rather, it intends simply to show that blithe
claims that incrementalist strategies are self-evidently the more reasonable
and preferable approach to rights activism must be dismissed as simplistic.
197. Hume's argument is that all reasoning concerning cause and effect are founded on
experience, and that all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition that the
course of nature will continue uniformly the same." DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 34 (Antony Flew ed., 1988). That uniformity, however, can never
be rationally demonstrated without presupposing that very uniformity. Any inductive reason-
ing, therefore, is fundamentally irrational to the extent that it depends upon this indemonstra-
ble proposition. See also Robert J. Fogelin, Hume's Skepticism, in Tie CAMBRIDGE COMPAN-
ION TO HUME 90, 94-100 (David Fate Norton ed., 1993).
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